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"'BROWN v. BOARD OF EDUCATION
WAS THE BEGINNING"
THE SCHOOL DESEGREGATION CASES
IN THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT: 1954-1979*
PHILIP B. KURLAND**
To mourn a mischief that is past and gone
Is the next way to draw new mischief on.
Othello, 1:3:158
Hath not a Jew eyes? Hath not a Jew hands, organs, dimensions,
senses, affections, passions, fed with the same food, hurt with the same
weapons, subject to the same diseases, healed by the same means,
warmed and cooled by the same winter and summer, as a Christian is?
If you prick us, do we not bleed? If you tickle us, do we not laugh? If
you poison us, do we not die? And if you wrong us, shall we not
revenge?
Merchant of Venice, 111: 1:49
* A lecture delivered at Washington University on January 31, 1979, as the sixth in a series
on The Questfor Equality. Copyright 1979, Philip B. Kurland.
** William R. Kenan, Jr. Distinguished Service Professor in The College and Professor in
The Law School, University of Chicago. A.B., 1942, University of Pennsylvania; LL.B., 1944,
Harvard Law School.
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Wrest once the law to your authority;
To do a great right do a little wrong.
Merchant of Venice, IV: 1:210
To rehearse once again the story of the school desegregation cases
cannot be an intriguing enterprise for either the writer or the reader.
Unlike Shakespeare's plays, which can be produced again and again
with new insights about the human condition almost every time, the
story of school desegregation is too well known, too much a part of our
own lives, to require, or even to permit, its presentation with any sense
of novelty or inspiration. Even Shakespeare, for good reason, offered
us no play about good Queen Bess, or even one on Bloody Mary. And
certainly none would dare to equate Shakespearean poetry with the
dull, devious, and doctrinaire language of Supreme Court opinions, not
to speak of the words of those lesser mortals doomed to commentary on
the ultimate voice of our Constitution. Nevertheless, it is the twenty-
fifth anniversary of Brown v. Board of Education.' A retrospective look
at the Supreme Court's efforts in the field of school desegregation may
at least reveal something about how the Court works and about the
limitations of the judicial process.
I.
The late Professor Alexander M. Bickel once wrote: "Brown v. Board
of Education was the beginning."2 He was not designating Brown as
the first school desegregation case. It was not. The Court had been
marching up the hill toward school desegregation for some time.
Surely the tread was measured. One could, to borrow a later-adopted
Supreme Court phrase, speak of the movement from the graduate
school cases to the grammar school cases as made "with all deliberate
speed."'3 The pre-Brown decisions were clear indications to some of
what the outcome of the public school desegregation cases would be
when the time came for the Supreme Court to decide them. To these
observers, it was a question of when, not of what. The graduate school
cases did not, however, afford any clear rationale for the grammar
school decisions they anticipated.
1. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
2. A. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS 7 (1970).
3. Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955).
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In Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada,4 Mr. Chief Justice Hughes
spoke for seven of the nine Justices when he denied Missouri the right
to exclude a black candidate for admission to its only state-run law
school on either excuse that it offered: (1) that the State would afford
him at least as good a legal education at any law school in another
State that would have him; or (2) that the State was working toward the
construction of an all-black law school that would soon afford a legal
education equal to that at the University of Missouri.
The Court did not get rid of the albatross it had hung around its own
neck-the Plessy v. Ferguson5 doctrine that separate facilities for blacks
and whites satisfied the equal protection clause so long as the facilities
were equal. In a way it reaffirmed Plessy: "The admissibility of laws
separating the races in the enjoyment of privileges afforded by the State
rests wholly upon the equality of the privileges which the laws give to
separated groups within the State."6 The Chief Justice wrote that the
appropriate measure was equal treatment not of blacks and whites as
classes, but of individual applicants' rights to share in the State's benef-
icence:
Here, petitioner's right was a personal one. It was as an individual that
he was entitled to the equal protection of the laws, and the State was
bound to furnish him within its borders facilities for legal education sub-
stantially equal to those which the State there afforded for persons of the
white race, whether or not other negroes sought the same opportunity.7
Ten years later, in Siruel x Board of Regents,8 the Court disposed of
a factually similar case by a per curiam opinion of but a few
paragraphs. No additional reasoning was offered: "The State must pro-
vide [a legal education] for her in conformity with the equal protection
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."9 It was only a week later that
the Court managed to avoid the question whether California's anti-
Japanese land law was unconstitutional as applied to aliens ineligible
for naturalization."0 Clearly, the Court was not yet ready to presume
the invalidity of any law classifying by race, national origin, or citizen-
4. 305 U.S. 337 (1938).
5. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
6. 305 U.S. at 349.
7. Id at 351.
8. 332 U.S. 631 (1948) (per curiam).
9. Id at 633. The State adopted the same kind of evasive tactics in Sipuel that would later
characterize the school desegregation cases. See Fisher v. Hurst, 333 U.S. 147 (1948).
10. Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948).
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ship. Sweatt v. Painter," decided in 1950, afforded a somewhat more
meaningful guide to the school desegregation cases in the offing. Texas
had accomplished in Sweatt what Missouri and Oklahoma had only
promised in Gaines and Sopuel: a separate law school for blacks. This
was not, however, said the Court, adequate reason for denying admis-
sion to a black student who sought admission to the white law school.
In a unanimous opinion for the Court written by Chief Justice Vinson,
the Court held that by all measurable standards the alternative schools
offered the black petitioner were not equal to the one at the state uni-
versity. More important, however, the opinion made it clear that ine-
quality inhered in the immeasurable cost of compulsory disassociation
of black law students from white law students. Nevertheless, the Court
refused to reexamine the Plessy doctrine, which, it said, did not control
the disposition of this case.
On the same day, in another unanimous opinion by Vinson, the
Court in McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents 2 struck down university
regulations that "assigned" the black petitioner, who had been admit-
ted to the University of Oklahoma Graduate School, "to a seat in the
classroom in a row specified for colored students; . . . to a [particular]
table in the library on the main floor; and. . . a special table" in the
school cafeteria. 3 Once again the Court found lack of adequately
equal treatment despite the essential identity of physical, tutorial, and
curricula properties available to the petitioner. The evil to be abated
apparently was not separate but unequal facilities, but the commanded
separation itself. By imposing this physical separation from his fellow
students, the State made McLaurin's education different and, therefore,
the Court said, "unequal to that of his classmates."' 4
The Court went on to underline that it was the State-imposed nature
of the restrictions, not social ostracism, that was constitutionally
invalid:
There is a vast difference-a Constitutional difference-between restric-
tions imposed by the state which prohibit the intellectual commingling of
students, and the refusal of individuals to commingle where the state
presents no such bar .... The removal of the state restrictions will not
necessarily abate individual and group predilections, prejudices and
11. 339 U.S. 629 (1950).
12. 339 U.S. 637 (1950).
13. Id at 640.
14. Id at 641.
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choices. But at the very least, the state will not be depriving appellant of
the opportunity to secure acceptance by his fellow students on his own
merits.
* * * Appellant, having been admitted to a state-supported graduate
school, must receive the same treatment at the hands of the state as stu-
dents of other races.' 5
Strangely, there was no mention of Plessy in the McLaurin opinion.
It would have been difficult, indeed, to square the two. Strangely, too,
not in McLaurin, not in Sweatt, not in Siouel, and not in Gaines did the
Court deign to take notice of its own opinions sustaining racial segrega-
tion in public schools, although the dissent in Gaines relied on two of
them. t6
Thus, by the time of Brown, the Court had two lines of authority
between which to choose, each distinguishable on its facts from the
other, if that were the Court's wish, but each implicitly, if not patently,
inconsistent with the other in terms of equal protection doctrine. "Sep-
arate but equal" did not fit the graduate school cases, however much
the Court was willing to pretend that it did.
II.
"Brown v. Board of Education was the beginning." Indeed, it was. It
was the beginning of many things, not least of which was the self-
licensing of the Court to recreate the equal protection clause in its own
image. After the first set of arguments in the school desegregation
cases, the Court set the cases for reargument on the question of what
light the history of the origins of the clause might shed on the question
of the constitutionality of racially segregated schools.' 7 As the unani-
mous decision for the Court written by its new Chief Justice, Earl War-
ren, said:
Reargument was largely devoted to the circumstances surrounding the
adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868. It covered exhaustively
consideration of the Amendment in Congress, ratification by the states,
then existing practices in racial segregation, and the views of proponents
and opponents of the Amendment. This discussion and our own investi-
gation convince us that, although these sources cast some light, it is not
15. Id at 641-42 (citations omitted).
16. Gong Lum v. Rice, 275 U.S. 78 (1927); Cummings v. Richmond County Bd. of Educ.,
175 U.S. 528 (1899).
17. 345 U.S. 972 (1953).
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enough to resolve the problem with which we are faced. 8
Alexander Bickel, who announced that "Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion was the beginning,"19 was present at the creation. Indeed, he had
a hand in it. As law clerk to Mr. Justice Frankfurter during the 1952
Term, Bickel prepared the memorandum that was the basis for circula-
tion by Frankfurter to the Court-and later saw light in a revised form
in the Harvard Law Review2°--that justified the proposition that the
history neither compelled nor precluded a conclusion that the equal
protection clause commanded desegregation. Bickel managed this re-
sult by bifurcating the question:
Should not the search for congressional purpose ... properly be twofold?
One inquiry should be directed at the congressional understanding of the
immediate effect of the enactment on conditions then present. Another
should aim to discover what if any thought was given to the long-range
effect, under future circumstances, of provisions necessarily intended for
permanence.2 '
That the due process and equal protection clauses of the fourteenth
amendment should be deemed elastic and dependent for their meaning
on the wisdom of the Justices was long a favorite theme of Mr. Justice
Frankfurter.2" The Court, despite Mr. Justice Black's fulminations
elsewhere against such broad construction as an improper invocation of
"natural law,"' 23 seemed willing to accept this position in Brown with-
out specifically adopting it.
In 1939 Professor ten Broek, who became the prime explicator of the
18. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 489 (1954).
19. See note 1, supra.
20. Bickel, The Original Understanding and the Segregation Decision, 69 HARV. L. REV. 1
(1955).
21. Id at 59.
22. See, e.g., P. KURLAND, FELIX FRANKFURTER ON THE SUPREME COURT 223-24, 460, 546
(1970).
With the great men of the Court constitutional adjudication has always been statecraft.
The deepest significance of Marshall's magistracy is his recognition of the practical needs
of government, to be realized by treating the Constitution as the living framework within
which the nation and the States could freely move through the inevitable changes
wrought by time and inventions. . . . Not anointed priests, removed from knowledge of
the stress of life, but men, with proved grasp of affairs who have developed resilience and
vigor of mind through seasoned and diversified experience in a work-a-day world are the
judges who have wrought abidingly on the Supreme Court.
Id at 121-22.
23. See, e.g., Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 69 (1947); H. BLACK, A CONSTITUTIONAL
FAITH 34-40 (1968).
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'old" equal protection,24 wrote:
Whenever the United States Supreme Court has felt itself called upon to
announce a theory for its conduct in the matter of constitutional interpre-
tation, it has insisted, with almost uninterrupted regularity, that the end
and object of constitutional construction is the discovery of the intention
of those persons who formulated the instrument or of the people who
adopted it.2 5
It must be conceded that this resort to history was that of advocates for
a position. As such landmark cases as Dred Scott v. Sandford, 26 Myers
i. United States,27 Pollock v. Farmers'Loan & Trust Co.,2 and Plessy v.
Ferguson29 quickly reveal, the Justices readily found in the framing of
the constitutional provisions at issue whatever intent they wished to
find. A reader of the Court's opinion in Brown might be excused his
cynicism which suggests that a finding of neutrality in the constitu-
tional history means that there was no support to be found for the posi-
tion that the Court was prepared to take.30
In any event, in Brown the Court abandoned the search for the fram-
ers' intent-an amorphous concept at best-and chose instead to write
a Constitution for our times. "In approaching this problem, we cannot
turn the clock back to 1868 when the Amendment was adopted, or even
to 1896 when Plessy v. Ferguson was written. We must consider public
education in the light of its full development and its present place in
American life. . .
The contemporary importance of education, or at least of schooling,
hardly afforded a rationale for resolving the question before the Court,
but only a reason for dispensing with the notion that what was meant
24. J. TEN BROEK, EQUAL UNDER LAW (1965); Tussman & ten Broek, The Equal Protection
f/the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. REV. 341 (1949).
25, ten Brock. Use bj, the United States Supreme Court of Extrinsic Aids in Constitutional
Construction, 27 CALIF. L. REV. 399 (1939).
26. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
27. 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
28. 157 U.S. 429 (1895).
29. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
30. Such cynicism would be fed by Raoul Berger's study of the origins of the fourteenth
amendment. R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY (1977). On the abuse of history by consti-
tutional lawyers, see C. MILLER, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE USES OF HISTORY (1969); Kelly,
Clio andthe Court: An Illicit Love Affair, 1965 SuP. CT. REV. 119. Nor can historians be credited
with a lack of bias any more than lawyers. See D. FISCHER, HISTORIANS' FALLACIES (1970). It is
the proof behind the assertions of each that must be the measure of truth, not the eminence of the
proposer.
31. 347 U.S. at 492.
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in 1868 by the language of the fourteenth amendment was still control-
ling. Distortion of "original meaning" was not a novelty even before
Brown. But Brown was the beginning of the expansive neo-natural law
syndrome that allows the Justices to act not merely as interpreters of
the Constitution, but as its creators. The conditions of education were
different in 1868 than today; we, the Justices, shall decide what kind of
constitutional provision would be most appropriate for today's condi-
tions and we shall substitute the new meaning for the old.
Such behavior gives some people qualms about the meaning of con-
stitutionalism, of what Bickel meant by "provisions necessarily in-
tended for permanence," 32 when the Constitution is acknowledged by
its custodians to be so malleable. That concern is not abated because
the Court acts one way and talks another, pretending that it speaks not
with its voice but with that of the authors of the Constitution. "The
voice is Jacob's voice, but the hands are the hands of Esau."33
"Brown v. Board of Education was the beginning" because it wiped
clean the slate. It enabled the Court to write its own code of equality in
substitution for the equal protection clause which, as late as the time of
Mr. Justice Holmes, was regarded as the last resort of desperate liti-
gants. 4 Professor Tribe's text on constitutional law describes "the
model of equal protection,"35 almost all of which is based on judicial
manufacture since Brown.
III.
"Brown v. Board of Education was the beginning," but not of new
constitutional doctrine or, if a beginning of constitutional doctrine,
only the merest adumbration of it. The opinion affords no principle on
which to build. There is only the factual proposition that compulsory
separation of the races in public schools is detrimental to black children
because it "generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the
community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely
ever to be undone. '3 6 That conclusion need not be questioned except
to note that the opinion's statement of the result is far clearer than its
proof. And it might be asked whether the meretricious state action
32. See note 20 supra and accompanying text.
33. Genesis 27:22.
34. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 208 (1927).
35. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 991-1136 (1978).
36. 347 U.S. at 494.
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causing such feeling of inferiority should not have invoked the con-
demnation of the due process clause rather than the equal protection
clause.
Aside from its conclusory statement, the Court relied only on its re-
cent graduate and law school cases37 and its own ipse dixit. "Separate
educational functions are inherently unequal. . . We have now an-
nounced that such segregation is a denial of the equal protection of the
laws. '"
The logical proposition in support of an equality argument that may
be derived from the language of the Court is: (1) adequate schooling
can be afforded only in classrooms that contain students of the white
majority; (2) white majority students are free to participate in schooling
with other white majority students, but black minority students are pre-
cluded by state law or constitution from sharing such schooling with
whites; therefore, (3) black students are deprived of equal educational
opportunity. The major premise, of course, has never been established
and remains the subject of much controversy among scholars of many
disciplines.
Whatever one feels about the conclusion reached by the Court-and
I, for one, am wholeheartedly in agreement with the conclusion that
compulsory segregation of schools by race is unconstitutional-the
opinion was a shabby, disingenuous way of disposing of some of the
most consequential cases before the Supreme Court since Dred Scott.39
It has been excused largely on the ground that the opinion was the
result of desperate negotiations aimed at assuring unanimity rather
than clarity. Most committee efforts bear the stigmata of compromise.
Certainly, majority Supreme Court opinions frequently do, and not
least in cases of great social consequence, when unanimity must be re-
garded as "a miracle of rare device."4
The Court did not purport to overrule Plessy v. Ferguson or the doc-
trine of separate-but-equal that it spawned. Instead, after reciting the
adverse effect of segregated schooling on the psyches of black students,
the Court wrote: "Whatever may have been the extent of psychological
knowledge at the time of Plessj, v. Ferguson, this finding is amply sup-
ported by modem authority. Any language in Plessy v. Ferguson con-
37. See notes 18-29 supra and accompanying text.
38. 347 U.S. at 495.
39. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
40. Coleridge, Kubla Khan, in OXFORD BOOK OF ENGLISH VERSE 669 (1940).
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trary to this finding is rejected."'" It was here that the Court inserted a
footnote with references to several social science papers, but only to
support the proposal that the science of psychology had advanced be-
yond what it may have been in Plessy's day. It would take an extraor-
dinarily sophisticated, or perhaps an extraordinarily naive, approach to
judicial behavior to believe that the cited literature was the cause of the
Court's judgment rather than the result of it.42
It is not enough, Professor Felix Frankfurter once told his colleague
Professor Thomas Reed Powell, to point out to students that the
Court's reasoning is defective. A good instructor would invite the stu-
dents to speculate on the reasons for the shoddiness of the opinions.
After all, Frankfurter said the Professor should tell his students, the
Justices are "probably as bright as you are, even as bright as I am."43
And so, without weighing the validity of the Frankfurter dictum, I ask
the reader to ponder why the Brown opinion was so wanting in reason.
For myself, I thought that the answer was to be found in the proposi-
tion that I have been reiterating: "Brown v. Board of Education was the
beginning." And so,the Court did not mean Brown to determine or
even to suggest the answers to the myriad of legal problems that would
flow from its revolutionary decision to strike down Jim Crow, at least
in public school classrooms. Time and experience would be necessary
for a fuller delineation of constitutional principles.
But my analysis will not wash in the light of the companion case of
Bolling v. Sharpe," which struck down the District of Columbia's
school segregation law under the fifth amendment due process clause.
Perhaps it was the still accepted constitutional concept of federalism,
and the state power that it envisaged, that caused the reluctance to
speak out in Brown. In Boiling that restraint was not present, and the
opinion afforded principles, or at least measures, that have since been
frequently invoked not only in school desegregation cases, but also in
many decisions that make up Professor Tribe's equal protection model.
In Bolling the Court apparently was willing, nay anxious, to turn the
clock back at least to 1896:
Classifications based solely upon race, must be scrutinized with particu-
lar care, since they are contrary to our traditions and hence constitution-
41. 347 U.S. at 494-95.
42. See Cahn, Jurisprudence, 30 N.Y.U. L. REv. 150 (1955).
43. H. PHILLIPS, FELIX FRANKFURTER REMINISCES 276 (1960).
44. 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
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ally suspect. As long ago as 1896, this Court declared the principle "that
the Constitution of the United States, in its present form, forbids, so far as
civil and political rights are concerned, discrimination by the General
Government, or by the States, against any citizen because of his
race ....
• . . Liberty under law extends to the full range of conduct which the
individual is free to pursue, and it cannot be restricted except for a proper
governmental objective. Segregation in public education is not reason-
ably related to any proper governmental objective, and thus it imposes on
Negro children of the District of Columbia a burden that constitutes an
arbitrary deprivation of their liberty in violation of the Due Process
Clause.4 5
Having supplied more than adequate basis for its decision in ruling
that racial differences afford no rational basis for legal distinctions, the
Court insisted on trying to lift itself by its bootstraps to a height it had
already attained: "In view of our decision that the Constitution prohib-
its the states from maintaining racially segregated public schools, it
would be unthinkable that the same Constitution would impose a lesser
duty on the Federal Government."46
This is a classic case of insisting on putting the cart before the horse.
Having used the proposition of illegal classification, theretofore an
equal protection concept, to justify a finding of due process violation,
the Court felt compelled to resort to its equal protection ruling, in
which it did not rest on invalid classification, to bolster its due process
ruling. How much better it might have been for the Court to have
made Brown the tail to the Bolling kite, rather than vice versa.
A judicial critic even brighter than Frankfurter's "you or I," Judge
Learned Hand, speculated about the meaning of what he called "The
Segregation Cases":
In these decisions did the Court mean to "overrule" the "legislative judg-
ment" of states by its own re-appraisal of the relative values at stake? Or
did it hold that it was alone enough to invalidate the statutes that they
had denied racial equality because the amendment inexorably exempts
that interest from legislative appraisal? It seems to me that we must as-
sume that it did mean to reverse the "legislative judgment" by its own
appraisal. . . . Plessy v. Ferguson was not overruled in form anyway
... I do not see how this distinction can be reconciled with the notion
that racial equality is a paramount value that state legislatures are not to
45. Id. at 499-500.
46. Id at 500.
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appraise and whose invasion is fatal to the validity of any statute.47
It may be that the Court really provided two strings for its bow:
Brown, available to suggest the need to have judicial values prevail
over a legislature's; and Boiling,to damn the use of race as a basis for
legislative classification except in the nonexistent case of a reasonable
connection between race and a legitimate governmental objective. In-
deed, history has since revealed that the Court has vacillated between
the alternative meanings suggested by Judge Learned Hand.
In fact, however, Hand's reliance on the Court's distinction, rather
than overruling, of Plessy v. Ferguson was totally discounted by the
Court's behavior in a series of per curiam decisions following Brown
and Bolling. Citing Brown and not Bolling, the Court in quick se-
quence struck down state-maintained segregated parks,48 beaches and
bath houses,4 9 golf courses, 50 and public transportation .5  Despite the
emphasis on the special quality of education as a reason for dist-
inguishing Plessy, the Court readily demonstrated, with even less rea-
soning than it afforded in Brown, that the doctrine of separate-but-
equal had been effectively demolished in the school desegregation
cases. These memorandum decisions more appropriately would have
been disposed of by reference to the Bolling standard that segregation
by race "is not reasonably related to any proper governmental objec-
tive."52 But the cases involved state action, not federal, and so the label
invoked was Brown rather than Bolling, with the implication that they
both said the same thing in different words.
After Brown and Boiling, school desegregation cases afforded the
Supreme Court few vehicles for shaping equal protection doctrine, but
only means for reshaping the Constitution's allocation and limitation
of governmental powers among the three branches of the national gov-
ernment and between the national and state governments.
IV.
"Brown v. Board of Education was the beginning." The proposition
47. L. HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 54-55 (1958).
48. Muir v. Louisville Park Theatrical Ass'n, 347 U.S. 971 (1954).
49. Mayor of Baltimore v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877 (1955).
50. Holmes v. City of Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879 (1955).
51. Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (1956).
52. See note 45 supra and accompanying text.
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is even more appropriately applied to Brown JJ,53 as it has come to be
called, than to Brown I. The Brown cases were first argued during the
1952 Term and were set for reargument during the 1953 Term. It has
been said, without much evidence, that the intervening death of Chief
Justice Vinson and his replacement by Earl Warren made the differ-
ence between victory and defeat for plaintiffs. I do not believe it. It
might have made the difference between a unanimous opinion and a
divided Court. It surely made a difference in the shaping of the opin-
ion. But the price of unanimity may have come too high, and certainly
we could have done with a better opinion.
After the decision in Brown I, the case was again set for reargument;
not for reargument on the issue of constitutional violation, but for ar-
gument on the form of the decree. Again the Court put to counsel two
of the questions first proposed for answer on the reargument of the
merits. They were questions numbered "4" and "5," complex ques-
tions, not simple ones. The Court asked, first, whether it should enter a
decree calling "forthwith" for admission of "Negro children ... to
schools of their choice. . . within the limits set by normal geographic
school districting," or, in the alternative, whether the Court should
"permit an effective gradual adjustment . . . from existing segregated
systems to a system not based on color distinction. 54 The second ques-
tion was whether the Supreme Court should itself frame the decree,
appoint a special master to do so, or remand the cases to the trial courts
for disposition." The essential question, it turned out, was whether the
Court should act in its ordinary judicial mode, or whether the special
nature of the problem called for assumption of a legislative role. The
Court chose the latter.
Counsel for plaintiffs argued that the Court should write a decree for
immediate, or the quickest feasible, effectuation of its holding that seg-
regation by race was unconstitutional. Counsel for defendants argued
that so fundamental a change in the life of the South could not be
brought about immediately, that time was necessary to secure conform-
ity with the Brown I holding. Each case, they said, was factually
unique, particularly with regard to the proportionate numbers of black
and white schoolchildren to be accommodated within each system. De-
fendants' counsel contended that federal trial court judges were most
53. 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
54. 347 U.S. at 495 n.13.
55. Id
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knowledgeable about the conditions of the school districts within their
jurisdictions and could, therefore, best adapt the constitutional rule to
particular facts. 56 Defendants prevailed.
Whether as the result of a sudden loss of nerve in light of the violent
reaction to Brown I, or as a price paid for the unanimity it had shown
there, the Court relegated the power of disposition to the federal dis-
trict courts with the admonition that desegregation of the schools must
occur "with all deliberate speed."'57 The "deliberate speed" phrase has
been attributed to Francis Thompson's poem, Hound of Heaven, al-
though Frankfurter, its obvious sponsor on this occasion, sought to
trace it to classical equity decrees. It might have been better had the
Court looked to Shakespeare's Henry VI rather than to Thompson's
effort: "Defer no time, delays have dangerous ends."58
Brown II emphasized the breadth of equity powers that could be
invoked by the district courts as well as the wide range of issues that
could be taken into consideration by those courts in effecting the social
revolution implicit in the substantive decision:
[T]he courts may consider problems related to administration, arising
from the physical condition of the school plant, the school transportation
system, personnel, revision of school districts and attendance areas into
compact units to achieve a system of determining admission to the public
schools on a nonracial basis, and revision of local laws and regulations
which may be necessary in solving the foregoing problems.59
In short, the federal courts were to substitute themselves for the local
governing bodies with regard to the management of apparently all as-
pects of schooling except curriculum, and even that was later to come
within the judicial ken. How much better it might have been had the
Court directed, as it had suggested in question "4," that "Negro chil-
dren" should "forthwith" be admitted "to schools of their choice...
within the limits set by normal geographic school districting."60 Every
one of the items in the Court's catalogue of relevant factors, and partic-
ularly the powers over "transportation" and redistricting, were to lead
56. Plaintiffs' and defendants' arguments and briefs are reproduced in volumes 49 and 49A
P. KURLAND & G. CASPER, LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS IN THE SUPREME COURT OF
THE UNITED STATES: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1977).
57. 349 U.S. at 301.
58. W. SHAKESPEARE, HENRY VI, Act I, sc. 3, 1. 33.
59. 349 U.S. at 300-01.
60. See note 54 supra and accompanying text.
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to lengthy and complex litigation, some of which is still pending in the
Supreme Court on the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Brown I decision.
Brown II was, thus, the beginning of the extensive use of federal
courts as overseers of units of local government. In Hamiltonian terms,
the courts were to have "will" and "force" as well as "judgment."',
Today it is not regarded as unusual for the federal courts to undertake
such assignments. Indeed, the Supreme Court was subjected to some
chastisement when it recently rejected the proposal that federal courts
take over the supervision of the Philadelphia police department.62
One of our most able federal judges, Judge Carl McGowan of the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit,
pointed out that it was the wisdom of the founding fathers in providing
for the possibility of lower federal courts that made possible the great
expansion of judicial power in recent years:
It is, thus, no detraction from the Supreme Court's achievement in the
school segregation cases to conclude that its path was made easier, its
range of alternatives enlarged, by decisions taken earlier in the life of the
republic with respect to the organization of national judicial power. The
same can be said of many other advancements and alterations in legal
doctrine summoned into being by the Supreme Court's expansive reading
of familiar constitutional phrases. . . . Without the availability of the lo-
cal federal courts, it is difficult to believe that this audacious venture by
the Supreme Court into the political thickets would have appeared feasi-
ble in the first place.63
It was not just the availability of the lower federal courts, but the
utilization of them as governing bodies exercising wide-ranging equita-
ble discretion that marks the innovation of Brown II. "The general
practice is to leave the enforcement of judge-made constitutional law to
private initiative."'  The immediate progeny of Brown in the Supreme
Court was enforced in exactly this manner. Initially there were the
cases decided with reference to parks, beaches, and public transporta-
tion65 that were expected to be enforced without having the federal
courts assume supervisory control over the parks, beaches, buses, and
61. THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (A. Hamilton).
62. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976); cf. O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488 (1974) (denying
standing to challenge alleged racial discrimination in local administration of criminal justice).
See L. TRIBE, supra note 35, at 89, 155-56, 309, 994.
63. C. McGOWAN, THE ORGANIZATION OF JUDICIAL POWER IN THE UNITED STATES 16-17
(1969).
64. A. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 111 (1975).
65. See notes 48-51 supra.
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the like. Then there were the cases involving schools of higher educa-
tion,66 and even a high-school level academy run by the City of Phila-
delphia under a trust for the benefit of impoverished white youths. 67 In
each of these cases, in which the Court undertook to issue per curiam
opinions, particular applicants had been excluded "solely on account of
their race and color." The Court ordered their immediate admission.
The Court held Brown If, both in its provisions for federal court super-
vision and for delay of effectuation of a decree, irrelevant here. The
Court did not suggest why Brown II should be irrelevant. The emo-
tional and physical response to the southern university cases were not
likely to be-indeed they were not-less violent than to grammar and
high school desegregation. The invocation of federal police at the Uni-
versity of Mississippi and the University of Alabama to effectuate de-
segregation 68 was, with the possible exception of Little Rock,6 9 never
necessitated by lower school desegregation.
It is true that the black student numbers at the university level were
small and would not quickly grow in light of the Court's mandate in
Hawkins v. Board of Control70 that admission was to be controlled by
"the rules and regulations applicable to other qualified candidates.'
It is also true that the higher education cases derived from rules estab-
lished before Brown in McLaurin and Sweatt. And, perhaps most im-
portant, the upper school cases did not involve the necessary mix of the
states' compulsory education laws with the rule against compulsory stu-
dent segregation on the basis of race. But the Court never suggested
these distinctions, or why they should be meaningful. It simply pro-
ceeded to treat these cases in the ordinary judicial mode.
V.
The next school desegregation cases to reach the Court reinforced
the concept of the federal judiciary as promulgator of edicts rather than
66. Pennsylvania v. Board of Directors of City Trusts, 353 U.S. 230 (1957); Florida ex rel.
Hawkins v. Board of Control, 350 U.S. 513 (1956); Lucy v. Adams, 350 U.S. 1 (1955). See also
Tennessee Bd. of Educ. v. Booker, 353 U.S. 965 (1957); Louisiana State Univ. v. Tureaud, 351
U.S. 924 (1956); Board of Trustees v. Frazier, 350 U.S. 979 (1956); Wichita Falls Junior College
Dist. v. Battle, 347 U.S. 974 (1954); Tureaud v. Board of Supervisors, 347 U.S. 971 (1954).
67. Pennsylvania v. Board of Directors of City Trusts, 353 U.S. 230 (1957).
68. See V. NAVASKY, KENNEDY JUSTICE 110-11, 159-61 (1971).
69. See notes 72-85 infra and accompanying text.
70. 350 U.S. 413 (1956).
71. Id at 414.
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as resolver of disputes. The Court convened a Special Term to hear
and dispose of Cooper v. Aaron,72 which was the consequence of the
invocation of force by the Governor of Arkansas and henchmen to
forestall the implementation of a school board's voluntary desegrega-
tion plan.
Between 1955 and 1958, time had not been kind to the Court's expec-
tations that reasonable men would, under the supervision of the federal
district courts, work out methods for school desegregation in the South.
Apparently, men of reason, no less men of good will, were in short
supply when dealing with so emotional a subject as school desegrega-
tion. Moreover, politicians like Faubus in Arkansas, Wallace in Ala-
bama, and Barnett in Mississippi, to name just a few of the more
raucous, saw the fight against desegregation as their ladder to glory.
Each saw himself as the Calhoun of his period instead of the tinhorn
that probably would be his label in history. Wallace, indeed, all but
parlayed his racism into a chance for the American Presidency.
In this instance, the School Board of Little Rock, reluctantly but ex-
peditiously, had prepared a plan for desegregation of the city's schools
even before the Brown II decision. The plan was certainly modest. It
proposed desegregating the schools at the rate of two grades per year
beginning with the eleventh and twelfth grades in 1957, and carrying
down to the first and second grades as the last to be integrated in 1963.
Plaintiffs did not see this as "deliberate speed," but were unsuccessful
in trying to prevent its approval by the trial court and the Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.
Meanwhile, the Governor and the State Legislature had declared
Brown unconstitutional and took steps to make illegal its effectuation.
But the school board proceeded with its plan. School integration was
not yet a hot issue in Little Rock itself. Calm prevailed in Little Rock
until the day before Central High School was to open its doors to a
total of nine black students along with its more than two thousand
white students. At that time, Faubus dispatched the Arkansas National
Guard in force to surround the high school to prevent the blacks from
entering. The school board, on petition for instructions to the district
court, was ordered to effectuate its plan. But the state troops effectively
prevented the admission of the blacks for three weeks. The nation was
treated, on television and in the newspapers, to the unedifying spectacle
72. 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
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of the use of the military against the enforcement of the constitutional
rights of nine black children.
The United States then intervened in the district court to seek an
injunction against interference by the Governor and the officers of the
national guard with the federal district court's order.7 3 The court
granted the injunction, and Faubus meekly removed his troops. But he
had attained his objective. A sadly militant group of the Little Rock
population replaced the troops. It became necessary for the United
States to send in the army to assure the attendance of the nine, reduced
to eight, black students. Thereafter, a portion of the national guard
was federalized and became the students' protectors for the rest of the
school year.
In the middle of the year, the school board petitioned the district
court for leave to abandon its plan. The court found such "chaos, bed-
lam and turmoil," with repeated instances of "violence" against the
black students, and "tension and unrest" among all concerned, that it
granted the board's petition.74 The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
reversed,75 but entered a stay against its own order pending review in
the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court -did the only thing possible to do if law were not
to be declared bankrupt against the claims of unlawful force. It af-
firmed the Eighth Circuit and removed the stay:
One may well sympathize with the position of the Board in the face of
the frustrating conditions which have confronted it, but, regardless of the
Board's good faith, the actions of the other state agencies responsible for
those conditions compel us to reject the Board's legal position. Had Cen-
tral High School been under the direct management of the State itself, it
could hardly be suggested that those immediately in charge of the school
should be heard to assert their own good faith as a legal excuse for delay
in implementing the constitutional rights of these respondents, when vin-
dication of those rights was rendered difficult or impossible by the actions
of other state officials. The situation here is in no different posture ....
73. Faubus v. United States, 254 F.2d 797 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 829 (1958).
74. Aaron v. Cooper, 163 F. Supp. 13, 20-21 (E.D. Ark.), rev'd, 257 F.2d 33 (8th Cir.) afd,
358 U.S. 1 (1958).
75. 257 F.2d 33 (8th Cir.), aff'd, 358 U.S. 1 (1958). The Fifth Circuit already had rejected the
argument of psychological unreadiness as a barrier to integration. See Jackson v. Rawdon, 235
F.2d 93, 96 (5th Cir.), ceri. denied, 352 U.S. 925 (1956). But see Hawkins v. Board of Control, 93
So.2d 354 (Fla.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 839 (1957). See also County School Bd. v. Thompson, 252
F.2d 929 (4th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 958 (1958); Allen v. County School Bd., 249 F.2d
462 (4th Cir. 1957), cer. denied, 355 U.S. 953 (1958).
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The constitutional rights of respondents are not to be sacrificed or
yielded to the violence and disorder which followed upon the actions of
the Governor and Legislature.76
Few would quarrel with the Court's decision except those committed to
lawlessness in the name of what they called a higher law. (This notion
of a higher law has since been more frequently invoked by elements
very different from the Faubuses and Wallaces of our land, but to the
same end of destruction of the rule of law.)
The opinion, allegedly authored by all nine Justices, would have af-
forded no surprises, except that it proceeded far beyond the decision of
the case. It had been the accepted learning that no one is bound by a
court's judgment except parties to the litigation who had participated in
it or had the opportunity to do so. "This means quite literally," Bickel
once noted, "that no one is under any legal obligation to carry out a
rule of constitutional law announced by the Supreme Court until some-
one else has conducted a successful litigation and obtained a decree
directing him to do so."'v7 That was not the Supreme Court's view of its
authority as expressed in Cooper v. Aaron. "Article VI of the Constitu-
tion makes the Constitution the 'supreme Law of the Land.' "'I Chief
Justice Marshall, in Marbury v. Madison,79 made the Supreme Court
the ultimate arbiter of the Constitution. It is, therefore,dincumbent on
everyone, and particularly officials sworn to uphold the Constitution, to
accept Supreme Court opinions as binding on them, although they
were not parties to it. Or to revert to Bickel's words: "[A] constitutional
rule once laid down by the Supreme Court creates a duty among al
persons affected, and especially government officials who are
oathbound to effectuate the Court's will to implement that law."8
Thus, in one fell swoop, a judgment became a ukase, with a rigidity
that the Court was never before willing to afford stare decisis.
The opponents of desegregation were asserting the same line of argu-
ment to a different end. They charged that the law of the land had
been expressed in Plessy v. Ferguson and the series of cases sustaining
segregated schooling that preceded the decision in Brown, and that it
was binding not only on the populace but even on the Supreme Court.
76. 358 U.S. at 15-16.
77. A. BICKEL, supra note 64, at I 11.
78. 358 U.S. at 18.
79. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
80. A. BICKEL, supra note 64, at 110.
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When, under Cooper v. Aaron, does a Supreme Court decision cease to
be the law of the land? When the Supreme Court announces the
change. But what opportunity will the Court have to announce the
change if all persons are foreclosed from bringing the issue before it
because of the requirement to abide by all Supreme Court decisions? If
challenges through the courts and the ballot box are both foreclosed,
the sole alternative is force.
Cooper v. Aaron offered the Court an emotion-packed issue. Frank-
furter, who had not before agreed to the Court's assertion of imperial-
ism,8 1 wrote an impassioned concurring opinion, pleading with the
nation to support and to adapt to the Court's Brown decision.82 The
rule of law was challenged by a sovereign state; "chaos, bedlam and
turmoil" were in the offing. The Court responded first with a calm,
reasoned expression of the resolution of the issue; then with its own
highly emotional screed about its authority. It denied recognition to
the fact that under our Constitution the executive and legislative will
may be effected through force, but the judicial process depends on con-
sensual acceptance of its authority, or it is doomed to self-destruction.
Contrary to the Court's Louis XIV's notion of itself, "'etat, c'est
moi," sociologists, who purport to be able to measure these things, tell
us that the Court and the rule of law it represents are both declining in
the people's estimation. Part of the cause of the decline is found in the
expansive notions of its own functions. There is anomaly in the re-
ported statistics. Thus, Professor Morris Janowitz reports: "On the ba-
sis of national samples. . . in 1949, 83.4% of the population expressed
approval and trust in the Supreme Court, but by 1973, the figure had
decreased to 32.6%. The Harris Survey for 1975 showed even lower
'confidence'; namely, 28%." 8 We are told by the same author that the
decline is attributable to the Court's "changes in the criminal justice
system and the use of law to direct sociopolitical change." o84 And yet,
"[s]ince the U.S. Supreme Court decision on school desegregation,
mass attitudes . . . in support of school integration have continually
increased. Public support for the goal of school integration. . . grew
81. See United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 308 (1947).
82. 358 U.S. at 21.
83. M. JANOWITZ, THE LAST HALF-CENTURY: SOCIETAL CHANGE AND POLITICS IN
AMERICA 383 (1978).
84. Id at 366.
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from 53% in 1950 to 78% in 1972 .... 1 While court actions have
modified the practices in a wide range of institutions, they have also
produced a marked decline in confidence in the legal system and in the
legitimacy of the coercive sanction of the state." 6 If these are anoma-
lies, there are still more of them to be found in the unfolding story of
the school desegregation cases in the Supreme Court.
VI.
The Supreme Court did not render another opinion in school deseg-
regation cases until 1963.87 In the interim the lower federal courts were
left to strike down various devices for evasion concocted by the states to
prevent the effectuation of Brown. Cooper v. Aaron8" afforded guidance
to the lower courts for dealing with tactics of interference, whether
taken in terms of the lofty doctrine of "interposition" or by the more
mundane transfer powers under "pupil placement laws."89 And the
courts of appeals insisted on a stringent rule of desegregation for higher
education in keeping with the Court's earlier mandate.90
The lower courts vacillated about the need to exhaust state remedies
before seeking injunctive relief in the federal courts. Whichever deci-
sion the lower courts made, requiring exhaustion of remedies9' or re-
jecting the requirement, 92 the Supreme Court refused to intercede.
The federal courts frustrated attempts to replace a complying school
85. Id at 381.
86. Id at 369.
87. Goss v. Board of Educ., 373 U.S. 683 (1963); McNeese v. Board of Educ., 373 U.S. 668
(1963).
88. See notes 71-85 supra and accompanying text.
89. See Bush v. Orleans School Bd., 364 U.S. 500 (1960).
90. See, e.g. Mississippi v. Meredith, 372 U.S. 916 (1963); Gantt v. Clemson Agricultural
College, 320 F.2d 611 (4th Cir.), ceri. denied, 375 U.S. 814 (1963); Brunson v. Board of Trustees,
311 F.2d 107 (4th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 933 (1963); Fair v. Meredith, 298 F.2d 696, 305
F.2d 341, 306 F.2d 374 (5th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 828 (1962); Board of Supervisors v.
Ludley, 252 F.2d 372 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 819 (1958); Booker v. Tennessee Bd. of
Educ., 240 F.2d 689 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 965 (1957).
91. Allen v. County School Bd., 249 F.2d 462 (4th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 953
(1958); School Bd. v. Atkins, 246 F.2d 325 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 855 (1957); Orleans
Parish School Bd. v. Bush, 242 F.2d 156 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 354 U.S. 921 (1957); School Bd. v.
Allen, 240 F.2d 59 (4th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 910 (1957).
92. Holt v. Raleigh City Bd. of Educ., 265 F.2d 95 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 818
(1959); Covington v. Edwards, 264 F.2d 780 (4th Cir. 1958), cerl. denied, 361 U.S. 840 (1959);
Carson v. Warlick, 238 F.2d 724 (4th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 910 (1957); Hood v. Board
of Trustees, 232 F.2d 626 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 870 (1956).
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board with one that would not comply, and that position was affirmed
by the Supreme Court.9 3 Attempts to invoke various provisions of the
Constitution as barriers to desegregation were all to no avail. No fed-
eral question was presented, it was said, in a suit to enjoin condemna-
tion of land for a nonsegregated school site.94 The first amendment did
not preclude citation for contempt for segregationists urging defiance of
court-ordered segregation,95 and a federal court enjoined as invalid a
state law making it a crime to induce support of desegregation.96 The
courts held that the eleventh amendment was no bar to suits against the
states or their agencies to enjoin segregation. 97 The conversion of a
building in an all-white neighborhood into an all-black elementary
school did not constitute a taking of property without due process of
law.98 The imagination of lawyers for desperate clients knew no
bounds. Their arguments would have been considered absurd at any
time when the Constitution was not in such a state of flux.
There were some leaks in the dike. A few less obviously camou-
flaged tactics were successful. A decision to enlarge a school in a black
neighborhood passed muster,99 as did a school districting plan that
placed a larger proportion of blacks in one district than in another.1'°
The Alabama Placement Law was held not to be unconstitutional on its
face and the refusal of a school board to assign pupils to the schools
nearest their homes was sustained by a judgment later affirmed by the
Supreme Court.10'
At the same time, the Supreme Court affirmed three-judge court rul-
ings that statutes authorizing the Governor to close desegregated
93. Bush v. Orleans Parish School Bd., 191 F. Supp. 871 (E.D. La.), af'dper cur/am, 365 U.S.
569 (1961).
94. Doby v. Brown, 232 F.2d 504 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 837 (1956).
95. Kasper v. Brittain, 245 F.2d 92, 97 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 834 (1957).
96. See Gremillion v. United States, 368 U.S. 11 (1961) (per curiam), af'g, 194 F. Supp. 182
(E.D. La. 1961).
97. See, e.g., East Baton Rouge Parish School Bd. v. Davis, 287 F.2d 380 (5th Cir.), cer.
denied, 368 U.S. 831 (1961); St. Helena Parish School Bd. v. Hall, 287 F.2d 376 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 368 U.S. 830 (1961); Louisiana State Bd. of Educ. v. Allen, 287 F.2d 32 (5th Cir.), cer.
denied, 368 U.S. 830 (1961).
98. Chandler v. Board of Pub. Educ., 313 F.2d 636 (5th Cir.), cer. denied, 375 U.S. 835
(1963).
99. Alexander v. County Bd., 371 U.S. 824 (1962) (denial of certiorari).
100. Sealy v. Department of Pub. Instruction, 252 F.2d 898 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 975
(1958).
101. Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 162 F. Supp. 373, 384 (N.D. Ala.), affdper
cur/am, 358 U.S. 101 (1958).
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schools or to withhold state funds from them were unconstitutional.° 2
And the Court refused to review a Fourth Circuit decision holding that
Norfolk, Virginia, could not withhold previously appropriated funds
from a school that had been desegregated."t 3 Where a school board
had, in good faith, commenced proceedings toward desegregation, the
federal court stayed its hand;'0 4 but a school board that had yet taken
no steps toward desegregation would not be afforded seven years to
effectuate its plan. 05
The lower courts, five years after the decision in Brown II, began to
reject plans that failed to meet proper goals. A year-by-year integra-
tion plan was rejected as too little and too late. 0 6 Courts of appeals
compelled temporary injunctions ordering commencement of desegre-
gation processes against the will of reluctant trial judges. 0 7 Jury trials
were held not available to parties in school desegregation cases. l0S The
Court was not yet ready in 1964 to take up a case from Indiana holding
that racial imbalance resulting from neighborhood school assignments
was not a constitutional violation. 0 9 That question would worry the
courts considerably at a later time.
The Supreme Court in 1963, eight years after Brown II and five
years after Cooper v. Aaron, began to move into the desegregation
arena. By this time, the issues were focused not on what was a constitu-
tional violation, but rather on what was a proper and appropriate rem-
edy to correct any such violation. In McNeese v. Board of Education,"°
the Supreme Court held that exhaustion of state remedies was not a
prerequisite to a suit to enjoin segregation within a single public school
in southern Illinois. "The First Congress," wrote Mr. Justice Douglas,
102. Bush v. Orleans Parish School Bd.. 187 F. Supp. 42 (E.D. La. 1960), affdper curiam, 365
U.S. 569 (1961); Aaron v. McKinley, 173 F. Supp. 944 (E.D. Ark.), a9dper curiam sub nom
Faubus v. Aaron, 361 U.S. 197 (1959).
103. Duckworth v. James, 267 F.2d 224 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 835 (1959).
104. Avery v. Wichita Falls Ind. School Dist., 241 F.2d 230 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 353 U.S.
938 (1957).
105. Allen v. County School Bd., 266 F.2d 507 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 830 (1959).
106. Evans v. Ennis, 281 F.2d 385 (3d Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 933 (1961).
107. Armstrong v. Board of Educ., 323 F.2d 333 (5th Cir. 1963), cert. deniedsub nom. Gibson
v. Harris, 376 U.S. 908 (1964); Davis v. Board of School Comm'rs, 322 F.2d 356 (5th Cir. 1963),
cer. denied, 375 U.S. 984 (1964).
108. Robinson v. Brown, 320 F.2d 503 (6th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 908 (1964).
109. Bell v. School City of Gary, 324 F.2d 209 (7th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. -924
(1964).
110. 373 U.S. 668 (1963).
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"created federal courts as the chief-though not always the exclusive-
tribunals for enforcement of federal rights."' The rights sought to be
enforced here were federal rights, and there was no reason to condition
them on state action that, in any event, probably could not solve the
deficiencies.
More central to the nation's concerns in this area was the decision in
Goss v. Board of Education.12 There, the trial court and the appellate
court approved a desegregation plan providing for rezoning of the
schools without regard to race. But, apparently having satisfied the re-
quirements of Brown, the plan provided an escape hatch by a right of
voluntary transfer from any school in which the student was in a mi-
nority to a school where he would be in the majority. The Supreme
Court assumed the validity of the plan generally, but struck down the
transfer provisions." 3 The Court's reasoning seemed clear cut:
It is readily apparent that the transfer system proposed lends itself to per-
petuation of segregation. . . . [T]here is no provision whereby a student
might transfer upon request to a school in which his race is in a minority
Classifications based on race for purposes of transfers between public
schools, as here, violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. . . . The recognition of race as an absolute criterion for
granting transfers which operate only in the direction of schools in which
the transferee's race is in the majority is no less unconstitutional than its
use for original admission or subsequent assignment to public
schools ...
The alleged equality-which we view as only superficial-of enabling
each race to transfer from a desegregated to a segregated school does not
save the plans. . . . Not only is race the factor upon which the transfer
plans operate, but also the plans lack a provision whereby a student might
with equal facility transfer from a segregated to a desegregated
school ...
This is not to say that appropriate transfer provisions . . . not based
upon any state-imposed racial conditions, would fall. Likewise, we would
have a different case here if the transfer provision were unrestricted, al-
lowing transfers to or from any school regardless of the race of the major-
111. Id at 672. Cf. Brown v. Rippy, 233 F.2d 796, 802 (5th Cir.) (Cameron, J., dissenting)
(court should not interfere with administrative processes), cer. denied, 352 U.S. 878 (1956).
112. 373 U.S. 683 (1963).
113. Id at 688. Cf. Calhoun v. Latimer, 377 U.S. 263 (1964) (district court needs to test the
nature and effect of the plan); Watson v. City of Memphis, 373 U.S. 526 (1963) (desegregation of
public park).
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ity therein." 14
Although there was emphasis on the fact that the one-way transfer
provision would be conducive to segregation, the Court's primary em-
phasis focused on the impropriety of the use by government of a racial
classification as the basis for transfers. It appears from the Court's lan-
guage that what was to become known as "freedom-of- choice" provi-
sions, allowing free transfer to all students, would be valid."' It
proved to be a short-lived notion in the Supreme Court's jurisprudence.
The Court began to shake its fist vigorously when faced with the
history of clear defiance by the school board of Prince Edward County,
Virginia. This county was one of the original defendants in the Brown
cases. On oral argument there, its counsel had told the Court that he
could not foresee acquiescence by the white community to sending the
small minority of white students into what would necessarily be major-
ity black schools, and, he said, because it was a farm community, its
citizens were tied to the land; consequently, they had no way of avoid-
ing desegregation by moving. 16 When finally faced with an order to
desegregate, the County Board of Supervisors refused to appropriate
moneys to run the public schools in Prince Edward County. In 1959 a
private foundation operated a school for whites only. The public
schools were closed. In 1960 the all-white school received county and
state funds while public schools remained closed only in this one Vir-
ginia county. As a result of extensive litigation, the district court en-
joined payments of tuition grants or tax credits so long as the public
schools were closed and then ruled that the public schools could not
remain closed so long as the other public schools in Virginia were open.
The court of appeals, however, ordered the district court to stay its
hand until state courts had determined the issue. Thus, Grffin v. School
Board' 7 came to the Supreme Court, which rejected the notion of ab-
114. 373 U.S. at 686-89. The Court thus adopted the position taken by Chief Justice Warren
and by Justices Douglas and Brennan dissenting from the denial of certiorari in Kelly v. Board of
Educ., 361 U.S. 924 (1959).
115. 373 U.S. at 689. But qf Dillard v. School Bd., 308 F.2d 920 (4th Cir. 1962) (plan permit-
ting transfer of student from school where student was in the minority held invalid), cert. denied,
374 U.S. 827 (1963); Northcross v. Memphis Bd. of Educ., 302 F.2d 818 (6th Cir. 1961), cert.
denied, 370 U.S. 944 (1962).
The Court had previously ignored the Fourth Circuit's affirmance of a transfer plan that called
for black students to meet special admissions requirements to enter a primarily white nonsegre-
gated school. Slade v. Board of Educ., 252 F.2d 291 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 906 (1958).
116. See 49A P. KURLAND & G. CASPER, supra note 56, at 1163-68.
117. 377 U.S. 218 (1963).
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stention and proceeded to command relief.
The high court of Virginia had ruled that the County was empow-
ered under Virginia law to close its schools. The Supreme Court acqui-
esced in that ruling as a determination of state law, but the Supreme
Court held that closing the county's public schools while the other pub-
lic schools in Virginia remained open was a denial of equal protection
of the laws. Conceding that a state may choose to treat different coun-
ties within its domain differently, the Court said that constitutionally,
different treatment for different counties was dependent on the validity
of the reasons for that different treatment:
But the record in the present case could not be clearer that Prince Ed-
ward's public schools were closed and private schools operated in their
place with state and county assistance, for one reason, and one reason
only: to ensure, through measures taken by the county and the State, that
white and colored children in Prince Edward County would not, under
any circumstances, go to the same school. Whatever nonracial grounds
support a State's allowing a county to abandon public schools, the object
must be a constitutional one, and grounds of race and opposition to de-
segregation do not qualify as constitutional.""
The Court then faced the problem of determining the kind of decree
it should frame to secure the objectives of its order. Not this time was
the Court going to take the way out it used in Brown I: "That relief
needs to be quick and effective.""' 9 That the district court could stop
the payments to the all-white school by state and county authorities
gave rise to no question. But the Court then took a giant step forward
in the assertion of judicial authority:
For the same reasons the District Court may, if necessary to prevent fur-
ther racial discrimination, require the Supervisors to exercise the power
that is theirs to levy taxes to raise funds adequate to reopen, operate, and
maintain without racial discrimination a public school system in Prince
Edward County like that operated in other counties in Virginia.120
The Court had become fed up with its "deliberate speed" formula. It
should have been embarrassed that it took so long to say so: "The time
for mere 'deliberate speed' has run out, and that phrase can no longer
justify denying these Prince Edward County school children their con-
stitutional rights to an education equal to that afforded by the public
118. Id at 231.
119. Id at 232.
120. Id at 233.
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schools in the other parts of Virginia."121
The Griffin judgment had its problems. Although it purported to rest
on discrimination between the children of the one Virginia county and
the children in all the others, 22 that has never before, or since, been
held to violate the Constitution. The Court itself would rule that it was
not a constitutional violation in San Antonio Independent School Dis-
trict v. Rodriguez.123 If it were a violation, it would be only because it
was a means to an unconstitutional end-the perpetuation of segre-
gated schools in Prince Edward County. Indeed, it was the discrimina-
tion between the black and white children of that county that was the
fundamental issue. But, apparently fearful that the county would even
close schools for all children as the least objectionable means of achiev-
ing equality, the Court had to come up with a rationale for an order
compelling the reopening of public schools rather than simply an order
against racial discrimination in the schools. This it accomplished by
the proposition that an otherwise constitutional act became unconstitu-
tional if undertaken with an unconstitutional motive. Certainly, that
was highly dubious as a general constitutional proposition.
The opinion was even greater in its reach when it undertook judicial
control of the appropriations and disbursements processes of the
county. The husbanding of the taxing and appropriations powers to
the elected representatives of the people was of the essence of the Eng-
lish and American constitutions. Revolutions were fought to establish
that proposition in both countries.'24 Yet the Court, simply by its own
say-so, assumed the powers that had been denied Kings and Presidents.
The Court's simple proposition that its acknowledged power to negate
state taxes and disbursements is no different from the power to create
state taxes and disbursements is an excuse, not a justification, for usur-
pation of power. But then, if the Court can act in the legislative rather
than the judicial mode, perhaps its taxation without representation is
not inappropriate.
Griffin, however, marked the end of the first phase of Supreme Court
adjudications in the area of school desegregation. Griffin, like Goss and
McNeese, was still premised on the concept that the constitutional evil
121. Id at 234.
122. Id at 230.
123. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
124. See Kurland, The Colonies, the Parliament, and the Crown: The Constitutional Issues, in
POLITICAL SEPARATION AND LEGAL CONTINUITY 35 (1976).
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of school segregation inhered in its classification by race. The ultimate
measure of racial balance was still to be discovered or, at least, ac-
knowledged by the Supreme Court. Indeed, as with other illegitimates,
it has never been fully acknowledged by its father. The racial balance
cases stand the decisions from Brown through Grfn on their heads:
the later cases do not forbid racial classifications; they command them.
VII.
There is, perhaps, both irony and justice-the two are not infre-
quently in each other's company-in the fact that the segregationists
succeeded in delaying school integration only at the cost of causing the
federal judiciary to multiply its demands severalfold. "Brown v. Board
of Education was the beginning." And in the beginning plaintiffs' de-
mands, purportedly met by Brown I if not satisfied by Brown II's "de-
liberate speed," were for the elimination of race as a classification for
the assignment of pupils to schools.
Thurgood Marshall, in his oral argument to the Court, exemplified
the general position of the appellants throughout the Brown litigation
that race was irrelevant to any legitimate governmental objective:
Then I think whatever district lines they draw, if it can be shown that
those lines are drawn on the basis of race or color, then I think they would
violate the injunction. If the lines are drawn on a natural basis, without
regard to race or color, then I think that nobody would have any
complaint.12 5
By 1968, continued frustrations of the Court's hopes brought about a
change in what the Court viewed as its consitutional command. It was
no longer sufficient that the law treat blacks and whites the same; it was
now required that the law make them the same. The former was
clearly within the ken of the judicial power. Equality before the law or
equal protection of the laws, however you phrase it, has long been a
principle of the rule of law applied by Anglo-Saxon courts. Making
blacks and whites the same, rather than treating them the same, how-
ever, is beyond earthly powers. Pretense can be made by the reduction
of individuals to numbers. For numbers can be added, subtracted, di-
vided, and multiplied. The equation is a prime concept of even ele-
mentary mathematics as it can never be for the law, which, despite its
recent pretensions, must remain a humanistic rather than a scientific
125. 49 P. KURLAND & G. CASPER, supra note 56, at 321.
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discipline. Individuals are not fungible. But there was no explicit con-
stitutional bar to judicial pretension to heavenly power any more than
there was such a bar to its pretension to the legislative function.
Green n. Countv School Board'26 marked a new beginning, for it
started the changes in the meaning of desegregation from elimination
of the use of racial factors in pupil assignment to homogenization of
the student population within each school district and beyond. The
issue in Green derived from the adoption of a "freedom-of-choice"
plan in New Kent County, Virginia. Prior to the command for deseg-
regation, New Kent had two schools, one for whites and one for blacks.
Adapting to the commands of Brown, New Kent proposed that "each
pupil, except those entering the first and eighth grades, may annually
choose between the New Kent and Watkins schools and pupils not
making a choice are assigned to the school previously attended; first
and eighth grade pupils must affirmatively choose a school."' 27 The
Court conceded that this might have satisfied Brown, but for the first
time revealed that the rule of Brown was to be considered only a first
step in a far more sweeping judicial program. It did not say where in
the Constitution the requirement for such a program derived:
It was ... dual systems that 14 years ago Brown I held unconstitu-
tional and a year later Brown II held must be abolished; school boards
operating such school systems were required by Brown 1H "to effectuate a
transition to a racially nondiscriminatory school system." 349 U.S. at
301. It is of course true that for the time immediately after Brown II the
concern was with making an initial break in a long-established pattern of
excluding Negro children from school attended by white children. The
principal focus was on obtaining for those Negro children courageous
enough to break with tradition a place in the "white" schools. See, e.g.,
Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1. Under Brown II that immediate goal was
only the first step, however. The transition to a unitary, nonracial system
of public education was and is the ultimate end to be brought about
128
If Brown had secreted in its interstices what the Court in Green sug-
gested it had-that the obligation of the states was to eliminate not only
segregation but also its effects-it was one of the best kept secrets of
contemporary times. There was no hint of it in the few previous excur-
sions that the Court had ventured in this area. In any event, in Green
126. 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
127. Id at 434.
128. Id at 435-36.
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the Court suggested the possibility, but refused to rule, that the failure
of the parents and students to desegregate the schools through freedom-
of-choice was not a demonstration of free will on the part of the resi-
dents, but obviously the result of white coercion of black judgment.
The record was all but barren of evidence to prove this point.' 29
It is true that New Kent County was hoist by its own petard. The
school system consisted of two schools in a single county in which there
was no housing segregation. Assignment of students to the school clos-
est to their homes would have been a "colorblind" application of
Brown that would have effected racially mixed schools. The resort to
the more tenuous approach of freedom-of-choice plans in the light of
this simple alternative may have put this case in the Griffin class, a
constitutional plan vitiated by an unconstitutional motive.
Both Green and Raney v. Board of Education, 30 a companion case in
which "freedom-of-choice" was rejected because it failed to change the
makeup of the two schools in the county, made clear that the district
court supervision of desegregation was not to end with the adoption of
an acceptable plan, but was to continue through its implementation un-
til assured that "disestablishment has been achieved."' 3'' The third of
the troika of cases decided on May 27, 1968, fourteen years and ten
days after Brown, again measured the validity of a plan by whether it
resulted in biracial schools rather than whether the standards for ad-
mission were themselves nonracial. This time, however, the issue was a
"free-transfer plan" rather than a "freedom-of-choice plan," although
the substantive difference is hard to note.
In this new line of cases, again one found, some time later, more than
met the eye. But essentially the patent argument was that where
schools were originally divided between blacks and whites because of
compulsory segregation laws, the school system would be required to
devise a plan that would bring about biracial schools rather than totally
segregated schools, and the school system could not leave it up to the
129. The only "evidence" that "freedom-of-choice" plans failed because of "coercion" derived
from reports of the agency noted for its bias not its objectivity, the United States Civil Rights
Commission. In note five of the opinion, 391 U.S. at 440-41, the Court sets out these findings
preceded by the statement: "The views of the United States Commission on Civil Rights, which
we neither adopt nor refuse to adopt, are as follows ...." This is somewhat reminiscent of
Thomas Reed Powell's description of Chief Justice Stone as "neither partial, on the one hand, nor
impartial on the other."
130. 391 U.S. 443 (1968).
131. Id at 449.
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parents-in effect, the black parents-to bring about desegregation by
transferring or registering their children in what previously had been
all-white schools.
Strangely, that same Term, the Court affirmed per curiam a decision
of a three-judge court that allowed for the preservation of an all-white
state university and an all-black state university within the City of
Montgomery, Alabama.'3 2 Mr. Justice Douglas' dissent remained
unanswered:
Can we say in 1969 that a State has no duty to disestablish a dual sys-
tem of higher education based upon race? The three-judge court in a
careful opinion seems to draw a line between elementary and secondary
schools on one hand and colleges and universities on the other. The in-
ference is that if this were an elementary school, the result would be
different.
The problem is in effect a phrase of "freedom of choice" which was
113before us in another aspect in Green ....
Perhaps what Mr. Justice Douglas did not want to notice was that be-
cause Alabama's compulsory education laws did not extend to college
and university level students, freedom-of-choice was the necessary
mode for assignment of students of higher education. Nevertheless, the
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW), if not the Con-
stitution, would later accept Mr. Justice Douglas' view and demand de-
segregation of higher education in southern universities not by way of
nonracial admissions standards, but by way of allocation of programs
and benefits to lure whites into black schools and vice versa. 3
4
The 1968 Term, one of the Court's busiest school desegregation ef-
forts, ended its immediate reconstruction of Brown with a teacher inte-
gration case, United States v. Montgomery County Board of
Education. 35 The trial court in that case ordered that the goal of the
school system must be a "ratio of white to Negro faculty members [in
each school] ...substantially the same as it is throughout the sys-
tem."' 36 The court of appeals took exception to this part of the judge's
132. Alabama State Teachers Ass'n v. Alabama Pub. School & College Auth., 393 U.S. 400
(1969).
133. Id at 401.
134. General Education Provisions Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1221d (1976).
135. 395 U.S. 225 (1969). The Court in Bradley v. School Bd., 382 U.S. 103 (1965), decided
that segregation of teachers as well as segregation of students fell within the Brown rationale.
136. 289 F. Supp. 647, 654 (M.D. Ala.), rev'd, 400 F.2d 1 (5th Cir. 1968), rev'd, 395 U.S. 225
1969).
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order:
The decree under review states that schools with twelve or more faculty
members must begin the school year 1968-69 with at least one of every six
faculty and staff members being in a different race from the majority.
Because of the difficulties inherent in achieving a precise five-to-one ratio,
this part of the district court's order should be interpreted to mean sub-
stantially or approximately five to one. The decree is modified to this ex-
tent in order to allow a degree of flexibility in the application of the 1968-
69 interim requirements.
Additionally, whether the school board is in full compliance should not
be decided solely by whether it has achieved the requisite numerical
ratios. 137
The opinion for the unanimous Court, written by Mr. Justice Black,
was to a large extent an encomium to the trial judge, Frank Johnson,
who had borne the brunt of the Wallaceite antipathies in Montgomery.
The Court said, in effect, that were it not Judge Johnson, it might share
the court of appeals' concern about "rigid or inflexible orders."' 38 But
it was Judge Johnson, and the Court thought "it best to leave Judge
Johnson's order as written, rather than as modified by the 2-1 panel,
particularly in view of the fact that the Court of Appeals as a whole
was evenly divided on this subject."'' 39
Such extraordinary deference-or perhaps, a simple counting of ju-
dicial heads gave Johnson's position a majority of one-was unusual.
So, too, was the acknowledgment of change in controlling doctrine:
"We also believe that. . . we follow the original plan outlines in Brown
II, as brought up to date by this Court's opinions in Green. . . and
Groin .... "140 Finally, it should be noted that this was the first time
the Court stamped its approval on a racial ratio as a requirement of
school desegregation, albeit at the faculty level.
"Brown v. Board of Education was the beginning," but only the be-
ginning. The 1968 Term decisions, rather than the original ones, would
hereafter control the Court's attempted restratification of the American
society.
137. 400 F.2d 1, 8 (5th Cir. 1968) (footnote omitted), rev'd, 395 U.S. 225 (1969).
138. 395 U.S. at 234-36.
139. Id at 235.
140. Id
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VIII.
Before Green, federal courts of appeals had been satisfied with deseg-
regation rather than racially balanced schools.14 1 The constitutional
ban was apparently understood as prohibiting the use of racial classifi-
cations,142 rather than the fact of separation. 43 Yet, the lower courts,
and particularly the Fifth Circuit, were ready to find racial standards in
such measures as aptitude for study." A fortiori, classifications on the
basis of allegedly innate differences between the races could not
stand. 41 Only after Green was it clear that geographic zoning that did
not bring about desegregation was inadequate. 146
The Supreme Court first chose to avoid the issue that it ultimately
reached in Green. Thus, in cases affording it the opportunity to pass on
the utilization of freedom-of-choice plans as supplemental to geo-
graphic zoning, the Court chose to vacate the judgments in per curiam
decisions apparently because of the failure to provide for faculty deseg-
regation as well. 47 Review was also denied to lower court rulings es-
tablishing that HEW minimum standards prevailed over freedom-of-
choice plans.148 That utilization of race as a standard for desegregation
was not to be equated with use of race as a standard for segregation
perhaps could have been inferred from the Court's refusal to review
cases based on state law that called for racial balance in schools. 49
141. See, e.g.. Downs v. Board of Educ., 336 F.2d 988 (10th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S.
'14 (1965).
142. See, e.g., Brown v. School Dist. No. 20, 328 F.2d 618 (4th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom.
Allen v. Brown, 379 U.S. 825 (1964).
143. See. e.g., Deal v. Cincinnati Bd. of Educ., 369 F.2d 55 (6th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 389
U.S. 847 (1967).
144. See Stell v. Savannah-Chatham County Bd. of Educ., 333 F.2d 55, 61, 62 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 379 U.S. 933 (1964).
145. See Jackson Mun. Separate School Dist. v. Evers, 357 F.2d 653 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
384 U.S. 961 (1966).
146. See. e.g., United States v. Greenwood Mun. Separate School Dist., 406 F.2d 1086 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 907 (1969).
147. Rogers v. Paul, 345 F.2d 117 (8th Cir.), vacatedper curiam, 382 U.S. 198 (1965); Gilliam
v. School Bd., 345 F.2d 325 (4th Cir.), Yacatedper curiam sub noa. Bradley v. School Bd., 382 U.S.
103 (1965); Bradley v. School Bd., 345 F.2d 310 (4th Cir.), vacatedper curiam, 382 U.S. 103 (1965).
148. United States v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 372 F.2d 836 (5th Cir. 1966), aj'd en
bane, 380 F.2d 385 (5th Cir.), cer. denied, 389 U.S. 840 (1967).
149. Boston School Comm. v. Board of Educ., 352 Mass. 693, 227 N.E.2d 729 (1967), appeal
dismissed, 389 U.S. 572 (1968); Addabbo v. Donovan, 16 N.Y.2d 619, 209 N.E.2d 112, 261
N.Y.S.2d 68 (1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 905 (1966); Balaban v. Rubin, 14 N.Y.2d 193, 199
N.E.2d 375, 250 N.Y.S.2d 281, cert. denied, 379 U.S. 881 (1964).
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For the most part, however, the Court, through its review-denying
procedures, still supported the lower courts in their continued efforts to
speed up the implementation of Brown. Courts of appeals were order-
ing trial courts to issue preliminary injunctions to bring about desegre-
gation plans, 150 and lack of speed on the part of school boards brought
on court-imposed plans, although one plan calling for in-service
teacher training was too far in advance of its day. 5 The courts contin-
ued to strike down, with Supreme Court approval, state laws providing
grants for private segregated schools.'5 2 The Supreme Court also af-
firmed a trial court order that called for statewide desegregation bind-
ing even on school boards not parties to the litigation.15 3
There had been nothing in the Supreme Court's certiorari and ap-
peal processes that clearly revealed the shift that was to take place in
Green from desegregation to integration as the compelled standard. It
was not until Mr. Justice Brennan announced the result in Green that
the so-called second-step implications of Brown were opened to public
view.
Ix.
That "all deliberate speed" was to be excised from the judicial canon
was made clear by the Court in a series of per curiam opinions that
denied postponement of effectuation of desegregation decrees, even
pending appellate review of the legal questions raised by the lower
courts' decisions.' 54 In one of these cases, Carter v. West Feliciana Par-
ish School Board,55 Mr. Justice Harlan, joined by Mr. Justice White,
thought it necessary to reveal what he considered the hidden rationale
of these commands for immediate desegregation:
However, in fairness to the Court of Appeals and to the parties, and with
a view to giving further guidance to litigants in future cases of this kind, I
150. See, e.g., Davis v. Board of School Comm'rs, 333 F.2d 53 (5th Cir.), cer. denied, 379 U.S.
844 (1964).
151. Board ofEduc. v. Dowell, 375 F.2d 158, 168 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 931 (1967).
152. See, e.g., Brown v. South Carolina State Bd. of Educ., 296 F. Supp. 199 (D.S.C.), q,9'dper
curiam, 393 U.S. 222 (1968); Poindexter v. Louisiana Financial Assistance Comm'n, 275 F. Supp.
833 (E.D.La. 1967), aft'dper curiam, 389 U.S. 571 (1968).
153. Lee v. Macon County Bd. of Educ., 267 F. Supp. 458 (M.D. Ala.), a#Idsubnon. Wallace
v. United States, 389 U.S. 215 (1967).
154. Northcross v. Board of Educ., 397 U.S. 232 (1970); Dowell v. Board of Educ., 396 U.S.
269 (1969); Carter v. West Feliciana Parish School Bd., 396 U.S. 226 (1969); Alexander v. Holmes
County Bd. of Educ., 396 U.S. 19 (1969).
155. 396 U.S. 226 (1969).
[Vol. 1979:309
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1979/iss2/2
SCHOOL DESEGREGATION
consider that something more is due to be said respecting the intended
effect [of these decisions]. Since the Court has not seen fit to do so, I am
constrained to set forth at least my own understanding ....
The intent of Alexander, as I see it, was that the burden in actions of
this type should be shifted from plaintiffs, seeking redress for a denial of
constitutional rights to defendant school boards. What this means is that
a prima facie showing of noncompliance with this Court's holding in
Green [not Brown], sufficient to demonstrate a likelihood of success at
trial, plaintiffs may apply for immediate relief that will at once extirpate
any lingering vestiges of a constitutionally prohibited dual school system.
[T]his would lead to the conclusion that in no event should the
time from the finding of noncompliance with the requirements of the
Green case to a time of the actual operative effect of the relief, including
the time for judicial approval and review, exceed a period of approxi-
mately eight weeks. This, I think, is indeed the "maximum" timetable
established by the Court today for cases of this kind. 156
Mysteriously, to me at least, Justices Black, Douglas, Brennan, and
Marshall disassociated themselves from the Harlan opinion on the
ground that it retreats "from our holding in Alexander . . .that 'the
obligation of every school district is to terminate dual school systems at
once and to operate now and hereafter only unitary schools.' "157 Per-
haps they meant only that eight weeks was too long, but if so, that
would be a rather rigid reading of "at once," in light of the complexities
involved in substituting a unitary school system for a dual one. That
kind of speed would be consistent only with the substitution of a neigh-
borhood school system for the dual one, and even there, eight weeks
would hardly be excessive. The Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Stewart
said that they would have been satisfied to allow the desegregation to
occur at the beginning of the next school term as the court of appeals
had provided. 5
One Justice in this quartet also made it clear that it was the supervi-
sory discretion of the courts of appeals that was to be invoked rather
than that of the district courts, provided that it was invoked in favor of
the plaintiffs. Thus, in Alexander v. Holmes County Board of Educa-
tion,"'59 the Court had ruled:
156, Id at 291-93 (citations omitted).
157. Id at 293.
158. Id
159. 396 U.S. 19 (1969).
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The Court of Appeals may in its discretion direct the schools here in-
volved to accept all or any part of the. . . recommendations of the De-
partment of [HEW], with any modifications which that court deems
proper insofar as those recommendations insure a totally unitary school
system for all eligible pupils without regard to race or color.
The Court of Appeals may make its determination and enter its order
without further arguments or submissions. 6 °
Although a district court may consider amendments to the plan after it
had been put in place, "[n]o amendment shall become effective before
being passed upon by the Court of Appeals."' 16 1 Apparently, however,
there was to be no discretion in the appellate court to reject a trial
court's institution of a plan on the ground that it was not yet a compre-
hensive one. 162 The roads to desegregation and integration were, in-
deed, becoming one-way. In Northeross v. Board of Education,63 the
Court ruled that the court of appeals could not reject the trial court's
finding that Memphis was operating a dual school system, in favor of
its own finding that it was a unitary system. 64
Chief Justice Burger attempted to derive from Alexander a meaning
for the phrase "unitary system": "In Alexander . . . we stated, albeit
perhaps too cryptically, that a unitary system was one 'within which no
person is to be effectively excluded from any school because of race or
color.' ",165 This sounds of an attempted retreat from Green back to
Brown. This reading, however, does a discredit to the Chief Justice.
He wanted the case to be heard on the merits, but did not push for it
because there would be only seven Justices participating. He urged
that:
As soon as possible, however, we ought to resolve some of the basic prac-
tical problems when they are appropriately presented including whether,
as a constitutional matter, any particular racial balance must be achieved
in the schools; to what extent school districts and zones may or must be
altered as a constitutional matter; and to what extent transportation may
or must be provided to achieve the ends sought by prior holdings of the
Court. Other related issues may emerge.' 66
Surely this was a suggestion to take the matter out of the hands of the
160. Id. at 21.
161. Id
162. Dowell v. Board of Educ., 396 U.S. 269 (1969).
163. 397 U.S. 232 (1970).
164. Id at 235.
165. Id at 236-37.
166. Id at 237.
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various courts of appeals to reveal the Supreme Court's understanding.
Burger, as a replacement for the haloed Warren, was suspect at the
time as being anti-integrationist. When the opportunity came to ad-
dress the issues, however, it was Burger who wrote the opinion for a
unanimous Court in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Educa-
lion.167 But that was not to be until April of 1971.
X.
Between Green and Swann, the lower courts, under the scrutiny of
the Supreme Court, began implementing the newly ordained rule. 168
Racial balance was the new rule. 169 Geographic zoning within a city,
but freedom-of-choice outside the municipality, did not effect racial
balance and was invalid.170 Freedom-of-choice plans were al regarded
as things of the past-satisfying Brown, but not Green.' 17
In light of Alexander,'72 immediacy was the order of the day. 73
State laws purporting to validate freedom-of-choice plans were in
themselves unconstitutional, 74 and lower courts sustained busing re-
quirements 75 despite the language of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.176
167. 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
168. See, e.g.. Henry v. Clarksdale Mun. Separate School Dist., 409 F.2d 682 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 396 U.S. 940 (1969).
169. See Allen v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 432 F.2d 362 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402
U S. 952 (1971); Pate v. Dade County School Bd., 315 F. Supp. 1161 (S.D. Fla.), remanded, 430
F.2d 1175 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 953 (1971).
170. United States v. Indianola Mun. Separate School Dist., 410 F.2d 626 (5th Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 396 U.S. 1011 (1970).
171. United States v. Hinds County School Bd., 423 F.2d 1264 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396
U.S. 1032 (1970).
172. See notes 154-59 supra and accompanying text.
173. See, e.g., Holmes County Bd. of Educ. v. Alexander, 396 U.S. 1218 (1970); Stanley v.
Darlington County School Dist., 424 F.2d 195 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1066 (1970); United
States v. Tunica County School Dist., 421 F,2d (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 951 (1970); Single-
ton v. Jackson Mun. Separate School Dist., 419 F.2d 1211 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1032
(1970).
174. Lee v. Nyquist, 318 F. Supp. 710 (W.D.N.Y. 1970), aft'd, 402 U.S. 935 (1971); Alabama v.
United States, 314 F. Supp. 1319 (S.D. Ala.), appeal dismissed for want ofjuris., 400 U.S. 954
(1970).
175. United States v. School Dist. 151, 301 F. Supp. 201 (N.D. Il. 1969), modified, 432 F.2d
1147 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 943 (1971); Bradley v. Board of Pub. Instruction (unre-
ported decision), rehearing denied, 431 F.2d 1377 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 943 (1971);
Youngblood v. Board of Pub. Instruction (unreported decision), rev'd, 430 F.2d 625 (5th Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 943 (1971); Harvest v. Board of Pub. Instruction (unreported deci-
sion), a]fdper curiain, 429 F.2d 414 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 943 (1971); Singleton v.
Jackson Mun. Separate School Dist. (unreported decision), rer'd, 426 F.2d 1364, modified, 430
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The notions of Cooper v. Aaron177 were still dominant. A parent was
held in contempt of court for failing to send his child to school in con-
formity with a desegregation decree,' 78 but white parents were pro-
scribed from intervening to take an appeal that the school board had
eschewed. 179 And the Third Circuit sustained reverse discrimination
against white school teachers without Supreme Court interference.'8 0
Thus, all the soldiers were lined up to march straight toward desegrega-
tion through racial balance accomplished by busing. And that is what
the Court confirmed in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of
Education. ' 8'
XI.
Swann v. Charlotte-Afecklenburg Board of Education82 was the third
level of the constitutional structure for school desegregation, of which
Brown and Green were the first two. Brown was concerned with the
invalidation of unconstitutional means: the use of race as a classifica-
tion for assignment of students to the public schools, which they had to
attend. Green transmuted the means test to an ends test, le., it out-
lawed even nondiscriminatory assignment methods that did not bring
about biracial schools, at least in communities where separate black
and white schools had once been ordained by law. Swann was con-
cerned both with refining the definition of the ends specified by Green
and with the means that the courts could use to bring about those ends.
It also told Congress that this was the judiciary's domain on which the
legislature would not lightly be permitted to trespass.
The brush-off given the legislative action avoided serious constitu-
tional questions such as to what degree, if at all, may the legislature
proscribe equitable remedies used by federal courts. The Norris-
LaGuardia Act,'8 3 which had foreclosed federal court injunctive pow-
F.2d 368 (5th Cir.) (decision of district court on remand unreported), modfied, 432 F.2d 927 (5th
Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 944 (1971).
176. See notes 185-87 infra and accompanying text.
177. See notes 72-81 supra and accompanying text.
178. Board of Educ. v. York, 429 F.2d 66 (10th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 954 (1971).
179. Spangler v. Pasadena City Bd. of Educ., 427 F.2d 1352 (9th Cir. 1970), cer. denied, 402
U.S. 943 (1971).
180. Porcelli v. Titus, 431 F.2d 1254 (3d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 944 (1971).
181. See notes 182-202 infra and accompanying text,
182. 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
183. 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115 (1976). Compare New Negro Alliance v. Sanitary Grocery Co., 303
U.S. 552 (1938) (Negro organization's picketing of grocery store that refused to hire Negro clerks
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ers in the area of labor injunctions, never reached the Supreme Court
on a square question of its constitutionality, although it had been en-
forced many times on the assumption of its validity. 18 4 The other con-
stitutional issue avoided was the degree to which Congress, under
section five of the fourteenth amendment, could give meaning to the
amendment that would be binding on the courts.18
5
Title IV of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 defined "desegregation" in
terms that would have been highly restrictive if applied to the courts'
remedies in constitutional segregation cases:
"Desegregation" means the assignment of students to public schools and
within such schools without regard to their race, color, religion, or na-
tional origin, but "desegregation" shall not mean the assignment of stu-
dents to public schools in order to overcome racial imbalance. 186
All in all, the definition read like a reaffirmation of Brown in its first
sentence and a rejection of Green in its second.
A second section that would have created problems had it been held
applicable in constitutional school desegregation cases authorized the
Attorney General to institute desegregation suits, except that:
[N]othing herein shall empower any official or court of the United States
to issue any order seeking to achieve a racial balance in any school by
requiring the transportation of pupils or students from one school to an-
other or one school district to another in order to achieve such racial bal-
ance, or otherwise enlarge the existing power of the court to insure
compliance with constitutional standards.'8 7
It does not take much training in the reading of the English language
to notice that the "or otherwise enlarge" clause indicated that Congress,
at least, thought that transfers to effect racial balance were an enlarge-
ment of the existing equity powers that the statute would restrict. Such
easy reading of the statute was not for the Court. The Court chose
instead an ingenious, or ingenuous, if you prefer, reading totally per-
held lawful; therefore, the Norris-La Guardia Act deprives federal courts of jurisdiction to issue
injunction to halt picketing),with Laufv. E.G. Shinner & Co., 303 U.S. 323 (1938) (labor union's
unlawful picketing and harassment of market that did not require its employees to become union
members may be subject to federal court's jurisdiction).
184. See, e.g.. Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local 770, 398 U.S. 235 (1970); Milk Wagon
Drivers' Local 753 v. Lake Valley Farm Prods., Inc., 311 U.S. 91 (1940).
185. See Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966); Burt, Miranda and Title IZ" A Morga-
natic Marriage, 1969 Sup. CT. REV. 81.
186. 42 U.S.C. § 2000c(b) (1976).
187. Id. § 2000c-6(a) (1976).
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verting the legislative history it purported to rely on, which history it
neither quoted nor even cited:
On their face, the sections quoted purport only to insure that the provi-
sions of Title IV of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 will not be read as grant-
ing new powers. The proviso in § 2000c-6 is in terms designed to
foreclose any interpretation of the Act as expanding the existing powers
of federal courts to enforce the Equal Protection Clause. There is no sug-
gestion of an intention to restrict those powers or withdraw from courts
their historic equitable remedial powers. The legislative history of Title
IV indicates that Congress was concerned that the Act might be read as
creating a right of action under the Fourteenth Amendment in the situa-
tion of so-called "de facto segregation," where racial imbalance exists in
the schools but with no showing that this was brought about by discrimi-
natory action of state authorities. In short, there is nothing in the Act that
provides us with material assistance in answering the question of remedy
for state-imposed segregation in violation of Brown I. The basis of our
decision must be the prohibition of the Fourteenth Amendment that no
State shall "deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection
of the laws."' 88
And surely there was nothing in the fourteenth amendment to restrain
the courts from imposing whatever remedies they saw fit.
According to Swann, the courts were to assume authority over site
selection, construction, and abandonment of schools, and "district
courts should retain jurisdiction. . . to see to it that future school con-
struction and abandonment are not used and do not serve to perpetuate
or re-establish the dual system."'18 9
The trial court had ordered:
[Tihat efforts be made to reach a 71-29 ratio in the various schools so that
there will be no basis for contending that one school is racially different
from the others. ...
That no school be operated with an all-black or predominantly black
student body.
That pupils of all grades be assigned in such a way that as nearly as
practicable the various schools at various grade levels have about the
same proportion of black and white students. 190
188. 402 U.S. at 17-18.
189. Id at 21.
190. 311 F. Supp. 265, 267-68 (W.D.N.C.), vacated, 431 F.2d 138 (1970), reinstated, 402 U.S. 1
(1971).
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This, said the Court, in its typically jejune fashion, was not a rule for
racial balance in the school system:
If we were to read the holding of the District Court to require, as a matter
of substantive constitutional right, any particular degree of racial balance
or mixing, that approach would be disapproved and we would be obliged
to reverse. The constitutional command to desegregate schools does not
mean that every school in every community must always reflect the racial
composition of the school system as a whole. 19 1
With its negatives and its negative pregnants, the opinion provided no
guidance on why quotas were invalid, why this was not a quota, or
what were the limitations on racial balance as an objective. All that we
were told was that "the very limited use made of mathematical ratios
was within the equitable remedial discretion of the District Court.'192
The Court's ruling on the propriety of one-race schools in a desegre-
gated system was not much more forthcoming. One-race schools in
formerly dual school systems were suspect, but not necessarily invalid:
"The court should scrutinize such schools, and the burden upon the
school authorities will be to satisfy the court that their racial composi-
tion is not the result of present or past discriminatory action on their
part."' 93
Of course, majority-to-minority transfer provisions were valid "as a
useful part of every desegregation plan."'' 94 To support such transfers,
the voluntarily transferring student must be provided free transporta-
tion, and space must be made available to him at whatever school he
chooses within his options.' 95
The power of the trial court to alter attendance zones was very
broad. The facts of the case "graphically demonstrate that one of the
principal tools employed by school planners and by courts to break up
the dual school system has been a frank-and sometimes drastic-ger-
rymandering of school districts and attendance zones."' 96 The trial
court also was free to pair, cluster, or group schools to move blacks out
of black schools and whites out of white schools, although the resulting
attendance zones "are neither compact nor contiguous; indeed they
may be on opposite ends of the city. As an interim corrective measure,
191. 402 U.S. at 24.
192. Id at 25.
193. Id at 26.
194. Id
195. Id at 26-27.
196. id at 27.
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this cannot be said to be beyond the broad remedial powers of a
court."
19 7
Absent a constitutional violation there would be no basis for judicially
ordering assignment of students on a racial basis. All things being equal,
with no history of discrimination, it might well be desirable to assign
pupils to schools nearest their homes. But all things are not equal in a
system that has been deliberately constructed and maintained to enforce
racial segregation. The remedy for such segregation may be administra-
tively awkward, inconvenient, and even bizarre in some situations and
may impose burdens on some; but all awkwardness and inconvenience
cannot be avoided in the interim period when remedial adjustments are
being made to eliminate the dual school systems. 198
Having supported the bases for the widest possible dispersal of stu-
dents among the schools in an area of "550 square miles-spanning
roughly 22 miles east-west and 36 miles north-south," 199 the Court left
itself very little choice but to put its stamp of approval on compulsory
b using. Anyway, it said, thirty-nine percent of the Nation's eighteen
million public school students already went to school by bus all over
the country.200 Again, the limits on judicial power were not very strin-
gent: "An objection to transportation of students may have validity
when the time or distance of travel is so great as to either risk the health
of the children or significantly impinge on the educational process."' 0°
But that, of course, was a matter for the discretion of the district court.
Swann opened a long but futile political debate over the desirability
of compulsory busing. Although the briefs were replete with constitu-
tional arguments that compelled busing as an unconstitutional in-
fringement on the freedom of the bussed students, there was no attempt
to meet the arguments in the opinion. It was easier to ignore them.
Throughout the opinion, the Court talked about the imposition of a
desegregation plan as an interim affair, and the opinion concluded with
a note regarded as hopeful by some and horrible by others: Once a
unitary system had been achieved, the courts were no longer to be
charged with maintaining racial balance.
It does not follow that the communities served by such [unitary] sys-
tems will remain demographically stable, for in a growing mobile society,
197. Id.
198. Id. at 28.
199. Id. at 6.
200. Id. at 29.
201. d. at 30-31.
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few will do so. Neither school authorities nor district courts are constitu-
tionally required to make year-to-year adjustments of the racial composi-
tion of student bodies once the affirmative duty to desegregate has been
accomplished and racial discrimination through official action is elimi-
nated from the system. This does not mean that federal courts are with-
out power to deal with future problems; but in the absence of a showing
that either the school authorities or some other agency of the State has
deliberately attempted to fix or alter demographic patterns to affect the
racial composition of the schools, further intervention by a district court
should not be necessary.20 2
Thus, with a denial of legislative power to interfere, an approval of a
defined racial balance within a system, toleration of some one-race
schools if proved not to be segregative in purpose, an authorization for
even "bizarre" attendance zones, and the approval of busing, the Court
created all the essential tools for complete judicial control of school
systems that had once been state-mandated dual school systems. The
third story of the Court's school desegregation edifice was far more de-
tailed, if no more justified by reason rather than by fiat, than Brown or
Green. But the structure was not yet complete.
Swann, in typical fashion, was but one of a cluster of cases. In a
companion case, Davis v. School Commissioners,2 °3 the Court found
that the discretion exercised by the trial and appellate federal courts
was not to be indulged. The County of Mobile, Alabama, again a large
area encompassing 1248 square miles including the metropolis of Mo-
bile and 73,500 students in 91 schools, was bifurcated by a major high-
way essentially separating the city from the county. The "wrong" side
of the tracks was made up of a school population that was 65% black
and 35% white; the "right" side of the tracks had a white-student popu-
lation of 88%. Both the trial court and the court of appeals plans
treated the two sectors separately for purposes of pupil assignments,
which left 9 of the 91 schools with a black student population of more
than 90%. This the Supreme Court found intolerable.
Gerrymandering and busing were not only discretionary tools, as
Swann had suggested, but compulsory ones: "On the record before us,
it is clear that the Court of Appeals felt constrained to treat the eastern
part of metropolitan Mobile in isolation from the rest of the school
system, and that inadequate consideration was given to the possible use
202. Id. at 31-32.
203. 402 U.S. 33 (1971).
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of bus transportation and split zoning."2°4
Another companion case, McDaniel v. Barresi,205 was an unusual
case. There, the school board had effected a desegregation plan that
had increased black enrollments in white schools from twenty to fifty
percent by busing black students out of areas of black concentration.
White parents brought suit in the state courts to enjoin the plan on the
ground that it used race as the basis for assignment and contravened
Title IV. The Georgia Supreme Court granted the relief requested.
The Supreme Court reversed. Title IV was inapplicable and the use of
race was not only permitted, but required as a basis for pupil assign-
ment to secure desegregation.20 6
North Carolina's antibusing law, which forbade the use of busing to
create racial balance, was held invalid in the fourth Burger opinion in
the series. North Carolina State Board of Education v. Swann 20 7 held
that "state policy must give way when it operates to hinder vindication
of federal constitutional guarantees. ' 0
8
Just as the race of students must be considered in determining whether a
constitutional violation has occurred, so also must race be considered in
formulating a remedy....
Similarly, the flat prohibition against assignment of students for the
purpose of creating racial balance must inevitably conflict with the duty
of school authorities to disestablish dual school systems....
We likewise conclude that an absolute prohibition against transporta-
tion of students assigned on the basis of race. . . will similarly hamper
the local authorities to effectively remedy constitutional violations.20 9
Before the Court's next major opinions, there were two ripples in the
otherwise smooth judicial waters of desegregation. In Spencer v. Ku-
gler,2 10 the Court summarily affirmed a New Jersey district court's re-
fusal to breach school district lines to effectuate greater racial balance
among districts. In denying a stay in Winston-Salem/Forsyth County
204. Id. at 38.
205. 402 U.S. 39 (1971).
206. Id. at 41-42.
207. 402 U.S. 43 (1971).
208. Id. at 45.
209. Id. at 46. A fifth case in the series, Moore v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg lBd. of Educ., 402
U.S. 47 (1971), was dismissed because (1) there was no case or controversy-both sides sought the
validation of the statute held invalid in North Carolina Slate Bd ofEduc. P. Swann-and (2) the
Court lacked jurisdiction over the appeal.
210. 404 U.S. 1027 (1972).
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Board of Education v. Scott,2 1' Mr. Chief Justice Burger reiterated that
Swann had not condoned a racial balance plan: "Nothing could be
plainer, or so I had thought, than Swann's disapproval of the 71%-29%
racial composition found in the Swann case as the controlling factor in
assignment of pupils, simply because that was the racial composition of
the whole school system."2 z12 With respect, it would seem that the lower
courts reasonably could have believed that Swann had approved rather
than disapproved such a racial balance formula. Certainly, after ap-
proving such a formula as "a starting point," the Court in Swann had
suggested no stopping point.
XII.
After two further excursions into the problem of gerrymandering,
this time by the Commonwealth of Virginia's school boards rather than
by the courts, the Court entered the very deep waters of interdistrict
desegregation and school desegregation in communities that had never
maintained dual school systems by reason of state law or constitution.
The latter have been denominated "Northern" school cases, but the
term would seem to include all states outside the former units of the
Confederacy and a few border states.
The two gerrymander cases were Wright v. Council of the City of Em-
poria"1 3 and United States v. Scotland Neck City Board of Education.1 4
Virginia cities, as distinguished from towns, were independent of, and
were not within, any county. Thus, a city's boundaries ordinarily also
defined the school district boundaries. But cities were empowered to
enter into agreements with adjacent county school systems to leave the
control of schools within the county system.
In 1967 Emporia, which had been a town, became a city. By a 1968
agreement Emporia contracted with the county within which it was for-
merly located to use the county school system for the city school chil-
dren. Since 1965, the county school system, including Emporia, had
been operating under a court-approved freedom-of-choice plan. After
Green, the district court entered a new judgment ordering a "pairing"
plan in place of the outlawed freedom-of-choice plan. Two weeks after
the district court decree, Emporia sought to opt out of the county
211. 404 U.S. 1221 (1971).
212. Id. at 1228.
213. 407 U.S. 451 (1972).
214. 407 U.S. 484 (1972).
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school system to operate its own. Plaintiffs sought to enjoin such sepa-
ration of city from county on the ground that separation would in-
crease the concentration of blacks in the county schools and increase
the concentration of whites in the city schools. For the first time in a
school desegregation case, the Court divided five-to-four. It ruled that
the separation into two systems where there had been one was invalid.
Although most persons reading the bare facts would have concluded
that Emporia's motivation was to bring about a whiter school popula-
tion within its city-the sequence of events certainly suggest this-the
majority of the Court ruled that the motive of the city council was irrel-
evant. The propriety of its action was to be measured by its effect.
There was no doubt that the effect would be two unitary school systems
in place of one, and that one of the two systems would be blacker than
the system as a whole had been, and the other would be whiter. This
was enough to sustain the injunction.
As to "motive," the Court said:
This "dominant purpose" test [used by the court below] finds no prece-
dent in our decisions. It is true that where an action by school authorities
is motivated by a demonstrated discriminatory purpose, the existence of
that purpose may add to the discriminatory effect of the action by intensi-
fying the stigma of implied racial inferiority. And where a school board
offers nonracial justifications for a plan that is less effective than other
alternatives for dismantling a dual school system, a demonstrated racial
purpose may be taken into consideration in determining the weight to be
given to the proferred justification .... [But] we have focussed upon the
effect-not the purpose or motivation---of a school board's action in de-
termining whether it is a permissible method of dismantling a dual school
system. The existence of a permissible purpose cannot sustain an action
that has an impermissible effect. 215
In sum, a pure heart is a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition for
avoiding the restraints of a judicially mandated school desegregation
plan. It is interesting that the Court designated a system with 28%
white students and 72% black students, which would have resulted in
the county if Emporia were allowed to secede, as a "Negro" school
system, although the county school system as a whole, before the at-
tempted change, was 34% white and 66% black, and yet, not a black
school system. The Court, or its majority, attempted to explain this:
215. 407 U.S. at 461-62.
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[O]ur holding today does not rest upon a conclusion that the disparity in
racial balance between the city and county schools resulting from sepa-
rate systems would, absent any other considerations, be unacceptable.
The city's creation of a separate school system was enjoined because of
the effect it would have had at the time upon the effectiveness of the rem-
edy ordered to dismantle the dual school system that had long existed in
the area.2
16
This proposition offered hope to separate adjoining school districts
with disparate racial populations. For the Court to suggest, however,
that some day Emporia would be able to separate itself from the county
schools, when it discovered a means for doing so without "an adverse
effect upon the students remaining in the county," 217 was a vain propo-
sition at best.
In dissent Chief Justice Burger, speaking for himself and Justices
Blackmun, Powell, and Rehnquist, agreed with the majority's principle
but not its application. If the Emporia proposal, he wrote, "would ei-
ther perpetuate racial segregation in the schools of the Greensville
County area or otherwise frustrate the dismantling of the dual system
in that area,"2 the injunction would properly issue. For the minority,
however, the substitution of two unitary school systems for one neither
perpetuated segregation nor frustrated desegregation. The consequent
means for assignment of schools would be geographically and, there-
fore, nonracially determined. Here, the minority cited Spencer v. Ku-
gler2' 19 for the proposition that "a geographic assignment pattern is
prima facie consistent with the Equal Protection Clause."220 Although
this may be sufficient of itself with reference to systems that have never
been compulsorily segregated, the minority conceded that close scru-
tiny of the facts was required in a formerly segregated system. The
facts revealed to them that "the proposed arrangement would com-
pletely eliminate all traces of state-imposed segregation," 221 and the
minority, at this point, mounted an attack on the norm of racial bal-
ance, which was the sole basis for the majority's conclusion:
It is quite true that the racial ratios of the two school systems would
differ, but the elimination of such disparities is not the mission of desegre-
216, Id. at 470.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 471 (Burger, CJ., dissenting).
219. 404 U.S. 1027 (1972). See text accompanying note 211 supra.
220. 407 U.S. at 472 (Burger, CJ., dissenting).
221. Id. at 473.
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gation. . . . It can no more be said that racial balance is the norm to be
sought, than it can be said that mere racial imbalance was the condition
requiring a judicial remedy. The pointlessness of such a "racial balanc-
ing" approach is well illustrated by the facts of this case.
222
The minority also concentrated heavy fire on what the Court as a
whole seems long to have tolerated-the exercise of judicial discretion
beyond what constitutional objectives require and the gross interfer-
ence with local control of local school systems. It must have come as
some surprise to read the Chief Justice's words on these matters:
While we have emphasized the flexibility of the power of district courts in
this process, the invocation of the remedial jurisdiction is not equivalent
to having a school district placed in receivership. It has been implicit in
all of our decisions from Brown HI to Swann, that if local authorities de-
vise a plan that will effectively eliminate segregation in the schools, a dis-
trict court must accept such a plan unless there are strong reasons why a
different plan is to be preferred. A local school board plan that will elimi-
nate dual schools, stop discrimination, and improve the quality of educa-
tion ought not be cast aside because a judge can evolve some other plan
that accomplishes the same result, or what he considers a preferable re-
sult, with a two percent, four percent, or six percent difference in racial
composition. Such an approach gives controlling weight to sociological
theories, not constitutional doctrine.
This limitation on the discretion of the district courts involves more
than polite deference to the role of local governments. Local control is
not only vital to continued public support of the schools, but it is of over-
riding importance from an educational standpoint as well.223
To many, this sounded like a declaration of independence by the
four Nixon appointees from the doctrines that had been created before
their arrival on the Court. This was somewhat ameliorated by the fact
that the same four Justices joined in a concurring rather than a dissent-
ing opinion in the Scotland Neck case.224
The factual situation was similar to Emporia. The state legislature
authorized the city of Scotland Neck, located in Halifax County, to
separate itself from the county school system and establish one of its
own. Once again the Court found that the effect would be to impede
the dismantling of the dual school system in Halifax County and
should, therefore, be enjoined. The minority concurred in the judg-
222. Id.
223. Id. at 477-78.
224. United States v. Scotland Neck City Bd. of Educ., 407 U.S. 484 (1972).
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ment here because: (1) the effect would be to preclude desegregation in
an area of the county that would be left with a primarily black popula-
tion; (2) Scotland Neck did not fall within the historic category of cities
separate or separable from the county in which they were located, but
had to be transmuted into this class by special lcgislaiion; and (3) ihere
was no doubt that the motivation for the proposed separation was "the
desire to create a predominantly white system more acceptable to the
white parents of Scotland Neck." '2
These cases were followed by a further rejection of any congressional
role in school desegregation. In Drummond v. Acree, 26 Mr. Justice
Powell denied a stay of a desegregation order sought under section 803
of the Education Amendments of 1972, which provided for a stay
pending exhaustion of appellate review of any district court order
"which requires the transfer or transportation of any student. . . for
the purposes of achieving a balance among students with respect to
race.
227
Mr. Justice Powell reasoned that section 803 was limited to cases
with a "racial balance objective," which did not include all cases re-
quiring busing.225 His conclusion was buttressed by the language of the
preceding section of the statute229 forbidding the use of federal funds
not only for programs to "overcome racial balance," but also for those
that would "carry out a plan of racial desegregation.1 230 Because this
case was not a case to effect "racial balance," but only one to promote
..racial desegregation," there was no authorization in the statute to
grant the stay. This niggardly reading of the intent of Congress was
technically justifiable. It depended, however, on the notion that Con-
gress knew the difference between the "racial balance" cases and "de-
segregation" cases, because that difference was made plain by Swann.
Powell obviously found lucidity in Swann where most had found only
confusion. The question of whether Congress can cut off funds for
school transportation in desegregation cases is one that will certainly
arrive at the Court again some time in the future.
Emporia and Scotland Neck foreshadowed the harder problem al-
225. Id. at 492.
226. 409 U.S. 1228 (1972).
227. 20 U.S.C. § 1653 (1972) (expired 1974).
228. 409 U.S. at 1229.
229. 20 U.S.C. § 1652(a) (1972).
230. 409 U.S. at 1229.
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ready making its way up from the lower courts. What if it were the
trial court that sought to join two or more school systems into a single
unit rather than school systems seeking to create two systems where
only one had bloomed before?
XIII.
School Board of Richmond v. State Board of Education23 offered the
Court the opportunity to determine whether a trial court could compel
the merger of three school districts to eliminate segregation in one. The
factual situation was a common one. After desegregation of the schools
of the City of Richmond, an independent school system the boundaries
of which had been defined by the city's boundaries since the inception
of public education in Virginia, demographic changes had turned the
city school population heavily black. The trial court, at the instance of
the city school system, which had been a defendant in the desegrega-
tion case, ordered the amalgamation of the city school system with
those of two surrounding counties, Chesterfield and Henrico, which
were almost all white.232 The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
ruled that a compulsory joinder to change the racial composition of
schools attended by the students of Richmond was beyond the power of
the district court.233 Because Mr. Justice Powell had played an impor-
tant role in the events of the case, both in the city school system and in
the educational authority of the Commonwealth, he disqualified him-
self when the case got to the Supreme Court. The Court thereupon
divided equally and affirmed the Fourth Circuit's judgment without
opinion. Speculation became rife on both how the Court divided and
what Mr. Justice Powell's position would be when the next interdistrict
remedy case made its appearance.
Before the Court would again reach the interdistrict issue, however,
it addressed the problem of the obligation to desegregate school sys-
tems that had never been subject to a de jure rule of segregation that
had prevailed in the South and border states before Brown and that
alone had been the subject matter of the opinions from Brown through
Scotland Neck. Thus, Keyes v. School District No. I234 marks the
231. 412 U.S. 92 (1973).
232. 338 F. Supp. 67, 79, 245 (E.D. Va.), rev'd, 462 F.2d 1058 (4th Cir. 1972), aj9'd by an
equally divided Court, 412 U.S. 92 (1973).
233. 462 F.2d 1058 (4th Cir. 1972), aff'd by an equally divided Court, 412 U.S. 92 (1973).
234. 413 U.S. 189 (1973).
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fourth level of the Court's desegregation structure. This time Mr. Jus-
tice White excused himself, but the Court, although divided, had no
difficulty in finding a majority in support of the opinion and judgment.
Nevertheless, there were four separate statements of position. Six Jus-
tices joined in the Court's opinion and only Mr. Justice Rehnquist
dissented.
That Keyes was an excursion into a new realm was evidenced by the
opening paragraph of Mr. Justice Brennan's opinion for the Court:
This school desegregation case concerns the Denver, Colorado, school
system. That system has never been operated under a constitutional or
statutory provision that mandated or permitted racial segregation in pub-
lic education. Rather, the gravamen of this action ... is that respondent
School Board alone, by use of various techniques such as the manipula-
tion of student attendance zones, schoolsite selection and a neighborhood
school policy, created or maintained racially or ethnically (or both ra-
cially and ethnically) segregated schools throughout the school district,
entitling petitioners to a decree directing desegregation of the entire
school district.2 35
It is interesting to note at the outset that Mr. Justice Brennan bracketed
as alleged constitutional violations the charge that the school district
had "created or maintained" segregated schools. Certainly, "creating"
separation by command must be considered a violation of Brown, but
never before had the Court said that the maintenance of, or failure to
eliminate, racially identical schools, except to redress de jure segrega-
tion, was a violation of Green. If it were, the Court was taking on a
huge additional burden, for then de facto segregation-separation of
the races not caused by intentional governmental action-like de jure
segregation required cure and, presumably, cure now and not with "all
deliberate speed." But once again, the Court refused to walk a straight
line. It appeared to know where it wanted to go, but not exactly how to
get there.
The City of Denver, coterminous with the school district, contained
two major pockets of nonwhite population, one in the core city and the
other in an area designated Park Hill. The schools within the bounds
of these neighborhoods housed the bulk of the nonwhite student popu-
lation. The trial court found that the Park Hill segregation was the
consequence of deliberate action taken by the school board to encapsu-
late nonwhites in that area by such means as siting a new school in the
235. Id. at 191.
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middle of the area, gerrymandering attendance zones, the use of "op-
tional zones," and excessive use of mobile classroom units. 236 That
court, therefore, ordered desegregation-presumably, busing out blacks
and busing in whites-on grounds that Park Hill constituted "de jure"
segregation.237 The court refused, however, to boost itself from that
finding directly to the proposition that the entire district constituted a
de jure violation because a portion of it did. It did hold that the ra-
cially identifiable schools in the core city were "educationally inferior"
to the white schools elsewhere and thus were in violation of the "sepa-
rate but equal" rule of Plessy v. Ferguson; the court ordered a cure for
this defect by "a system of desegregation and integration which pro-
vides compensatory education in an integrated environment. ' 231
The court of appeals affirmed the Park Hill portion of the decree, but
rejected the program for the core city schools because it found no inten-
tional segregative acts as to them.239 The Supreme Court in Keyes held
that the lower courts had applied an erroneous standard for the core
city schools and reversed.
First, the Court noted that the trial court erred in considering the
Denver population to be triracial rather than biracial for purposes of
determining segregation. 4 At the time of the lawsuit, the schools of
Denver were "66% Anglo, 14% Negro, and 20% Hispano. '' 241 For pur-
poses of measuring segregation, the Supreme Court said the proper dis-
tinction was between majority and minorities, with the minorities
grouped together to measure the degree of separation.
The Court accepted the trial court's conclusion that there was clearly
de jure violation in Park Hill. The board's policies showed "'an unde-
viating purpose to isolate Negro students' in segregated schools 'while
preserving the Anglo character of [other] schools.' ",242 The Supreme
Court said this segregative policy directly affected a substantial part of
the Denver school district. (The Court played a little bit with the num-
bers here and asserted that the area included 37.69% of all black pupils
in Denver. Of the total school population, Park Hill included 9% of the
student body. Although the Park Hill minority was primarily black, in
236. 303 F. Supp. 279, 284-86 (D. Colo. 1969).
237. Id. at 288.
238. 413 U.S. at 194.
239. 445 F.2d 990, 1002, 1007 (10th Cir. 1971).
240. 413 U.S. at 195-98.
241. Id. at 195.
242. Id. at 199.
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the total city school population Hispanos outnumbered blacks in a ratio
of ten to seven.)
This substantial amount of de jure school segregation in Park Hill
was sufficient to trigger a requirement for desegregation of the entire
system:
[Where plaintiffs prove that the school authorities have carried out a sys-
tematic program of segregation affecting a substantial portion of the stu-
dents, teachers, and facilities within the school system, it is only common
sense to conclude that there exists a predicate for a finding of the exist-
ence of a dual school system.243
One man's "common sense" is another's nonsense. But the Court is
free to define a dual system as it sees fit. After all, the term was one of
its own creation.
Although it remanded the question "whether respondent School
Board's deliberate racial segregation policy with respect to Park Hill
schools constitutes the entire Denver school system a dual school sys-
tem,"24 the Court made it very clear, indeed, that there was only one
tolerable answer to that question. Just in case the lower courts were to
find that Park Hill was an isolable division in the school district, how-
ever, the Court directed its attention to the improper failure to find the
core city schools in "a current condition of segregation resulting from
intentional state action directed specifically to the core city schools. '2 45
That there was segregation, the Court said, was beyond doubt:
Eleven of the schools were more than 90% minority and twenty-two of
them were more than 70% minority. The finding of the lower courts
that there was no de jure segregation because there was no racially dis-
criminatory purpose and no causal connection between the acts com-
plained of and racial imbalance "was clearly incorrect. ' 246 It was
incorrect because the lower courts did not properly weigh the inten-
tional segregation in Park Hill as evidence of segregative intent in the
core city:
Applying these principles in the special context of school desegregation
cases, we hold that a finding of intentionally segregative school board ac-
tions in a meaningful portion of a school system, as in this case, creates a
presumption that other segregated schooling within the system is not ad-
ventitious. It establishes, in other words, a prima facie case of unlawful
243. Id. at 201.
244. Id. at 204.
245. Id. at 205-06.
246. Id. at 207.
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segregative design on the part of the authorities, and shifts to those au-
thorities the burden of proving that other segregated schools within the
system are not also the result of intentionally segregative actions. This is
true [whatever may have been said in part II of the opinion] even if it
should be determined that different areas of the school district should be
viewed independently of each other because, even in that situation, there
is a high probability that where school authorities have effectuated an
intentionally segregative policy in a meaningful portion of the school sys-
tem, similar impermissible considerations have motivated their actions in
other areas of the system. We emphasize that the differentiating factor
between dejure segregation and so called defacto segregation. . . ispur-
pose or intent to segregate ...
This burden-shifting principle is not new or novel. ....
In discharging that burden, it is not enough, of course, that the school
authorities rely upon some allegedly logical, racially neutral explanation
for their actions. Their burden is to adduce proof sufficient to support a
finding that segregative intent was not among the factors that motivated
their actions.247
Certainly, the shifting of a burden of going forward with the evi-
dence was not a novel concept. It should be readily understood, how-
ever, that the burden of proving a negative of this kind was equivalent
to the creation of an irrebuttable presumption or a rule of law. (One
wonders what Mr. Justice Brennan would have done with a state stat-
ute that provided that the necessary deliberation and premeditation to
prove a homicide could be derived from proof that at some earlier pe-
riod the accused had been guilty of a willful crime.) "The Court notes
that if respondent School Board cannot disprove segregative intent, it
can rebut the prima facie case only by showing that its past segregative
acts did not create or contribute to the current segregated condition of
the core city schools.""24 That the School Board had indulged in a
neighborhood school policy, and that it was not responsible for the
clustering of blacks and Hispanos in the core city was not to be an
adequate defense in light of the fact that it had discriminated in Park
Hill. All roads lead to Rome, or in Keyes, at least, all roads lead from
Park Hill.
Justices Douglas and Powell wrote separately in favor of abolishing
the distinction between de jure and de facto school desegregation. For
Mr. Justice Douglas, a school district in which there were any racially
247. Id. at 208-10.
248. Id. at 211.
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identifiable schools was subject to a court desegregation decree,
whatever its history, because the board had either affirmatively caused
this segregation or failed to alleviate it, which was also a violation of its
constitutional duty.2 4 9 Although this argument of duty to desegregate
whatever the cause of segregation had often been proffered to it, the
Supreme Court had refused to adopt it. This "no-fault" rationale for
judicial intervention in school segregation situations has not yet found
justification in an opinion of the Court.
Mr. Justice Powell also favored a single rule for both de facto and de
jure segregation. The affirmative duty to desegregate southern schools
announced in Green could, and should, be applied to northern schools.
He rejected the notion that the affirmative duty found in Green derived
from the need to restore the community schools to the condition they
would have been in but for the South's compulsory segregation laws:
[T]he familiar root cause of segregated schools in all the biracial metro-
politan areas of our country is essentially the same: one of segregated
residential and migratory patterns the impact of which on the racial com-
position of the schools was often perpetuated and rarely ameliorated by
action of the public school authorities. This is a national, not a southern,
phenomenon. And it is largely unrelated to whether a particular State
had or did not have segregative school laws.
Whereas Brown I rightly decreed the elimination of state-imposed seg-
regation in that particular section of the country where it did exist, Swann
imposed obligations on southern school districts to eliminate conditions
which are not regionally unique but are similar both in origin and effect
to conditions in the rest of the country. As the remedial obligations of
Swann extend far beyond the elimination of the outgrowths of the state-
imposed segregation outlawed in Brown, the rationale of Swann points
inevitably toward a uniform, constitutional approach to our national
problem of school segregation.25 °
But, as Mr. Justice Holmes once noted, "the inevitable comes to pass
. . . through effort." 25 ' And the Court has refused to put forth that
effort on behalf of "no-fault" desegregation. Mr. Justice Powell also
sought to invoke the notion of a prophylactic rule similar to that which
the Court invoked so frequently in rewriting the fourteenth amendment
into a criminal code of procedure252 for the states: "Having school
249. Id. at 214-17.
250. Id. at 222-23.
251. 0. HOLMES, UNCOLLECTED LETTERS 201 (1936).
252. See P. KURLAND, POLITICS, THE CONSTITUTION, AND THE WARREN COURT 74-84 (1970).
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boards operate an integrated school system provides the best assurance
of meeting the constitutional requirement that racial discrimination,
subtle or otherwise, will find no place in the decisions of the public
school officials. ' 253 The Court, however, refused to have Brown torn
up by the roots. It adhered to the principle that judicial intervention
must find a predicate in constitutional violation, which, here, is state
commanded separation of the races, however tenuous that predicate
may be, as in the case of the core districts in Denver.
At the same time that Mr. Justice Powell sought an extension of
Green and Swann-and he preferred to assert that Swann was the cul-
prit-to the nonsouthern tiers of states, he also would have cut back
Swann's approval of compulsory busing for everyone. Uniformity of
rule was his standard.
And a uniform busing rule also should be adopted:
To the extent that Swann may be thought to require large-scale or long-
distance transportation of students in our metropolitan school districts, I
record my profound misgivings. Nothing in our Constitution commands
or encourages any such court-compelled disruption of public
education ...
The Equal Protection Clause does, indeed, command that racial discrimi-
nation not be tolerated in the decisions of public school authorities. But it
does not require that school authorities undertake widespread student
transportation solely for the sake of maximizing integration.
This obviously does not mean that bus transportation has no place in
public school systems or is not a permissible means in the desegregative
process.254
Mr. Justice Powell then expatiated on the desirability of the neigh-
borhood school system, the financial strain so widely suffered by the
educational system, the unequal effect on the nation's school systems of
bearing the financial burden of compulsory busing-it would fall on
mixed urban communities-and "the fact that the remedy exceeds that
which may be necessary to redress the constitutional evil."'255 It will be
readily seen that the second part of Mr. Justice Powell's opinion is not
perfectly consistent with the first in its reliance on the need for a consti-
tutional violation as predicate for judicial remedy.
253. 413 U.S. at 227.
254. Id. at 238, 242-43.
255. Id. at 249.
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Powell then touched on the question that would be coming to the
fore again and again: Who pays?
The compulsory transportation of students carries a further infirmity as
a constitutional remedy. With most constitutional violations, the major
burden of remedial action falls on offending state officials. . . . It is they
who bear the brunt of remedial action . . . . But when the obligation
further extends to the transportation of students, the full burden of the
affirmative remedial action is borne by children and parents who did not
participate in any constitutional violation.256
Then came a proposition that is surely inconsistent not only with the
rule of school desegregation cases, but with the general egalitarian push
of Supreme Court decisions-that equality, as the Court defines it, is
the prime and, therefore, overwhelming constitutional value.25 7 Powell
said that he would return to the rationale of Brown and
[i]n the balancing of interests so appropriate to a fair and just equitable
decree, transportation orders should be applied with special caution to
any proposal as disruptive of family life and interests-and ultimately of
education itself-as extensive transportation of elementary-age children
solely for desegregation purposes. As a minimum, this Court should not
require school boards to engage in the unnecessary transportation away
from their neighborhoods of elementary-age children. 58
Nevertheless, Mr. Justice Powell had concurred in the judgment im-
posing desegregation on Denver. Mr. Justice Rehnquist dissented
alone. For Rehnquist, too, the objective was to go back to Brown, but
for him Brown meant the elimination of racial standards, not the at-
tainment of a proper racial mixture. In summation, he objected to the
extension of Green to northern school districts and to the transparent
use of presumptions by the Court in Keyes to effect that extension:
The Court has taken a long leap in this area of constitutional law in
equating the district-wide consequences of gerrymandering individual at-
tendance zones in a district where separation of the races was never re-
quired by law with statutes or ordinances in other jurisdictions which did
so require. It then adds to this potpourri a confusing enunciation of evi-
dentiary rules in order to make it more likely that the trial court will on
remand reach the result which the Court apparently wants it to reach.259
It took seventy-seven pages of opinions to bring judicially mandated
256. Id. at 249-50.
257. It has been for some time. See P. KURLAND, note 252 supra, at 98-169.
258. 413 U.S. at 251,
259. Id. at 265 (Rhenquist, J., dissenting).
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desegregation to nonsouthern schools. It required only a few pages in
Brown I to initiate the whole process. But it is doubtful that guidance
by way of principles is to be found in either case, except for the notion
that the lower courts should do the best they can, and that the Supreme
Court will deny review unless the exercise of discretion by the lower
courts brings about results that offend the consciences of the Justices of
the Supreme Court.
XIV.
Between Swann and Keyes, the Court had continued to use its discre-
tionary review process essentially to stamp its nihil obstat by denying
certiorari, with an occasional imprimatur by way of summary affirm-
ance, on the rulings of the lower federal courts. The lower courts
seemed to understand both the rulings and the directions of the
Supreme Court's decisions.
The Court affirmed a judgment that the promotion of a white junior
college to four-year status in the same city that had a black four-year
college violated the equal protection clause.260 Of course, there was
neither Supreme Court precedent nor principle on which to rest such a
decision. Bringing higher education into the racial balance context
would not readily lend itself to explanation by opinion.
Busing became the rule-almost a requirement rather than an op-
tional tool for desegregation.26t Racial balance was the goal.262 The
shaky distinction between de facto and de jure segregation became
260. Norris v. State Council of Higher Educ., 327 F. Supp. 1368 (E.D. Va.), affd tb nom.
Board of Visitors v. Norris, 404 U.S. 907 (1971).
261. See, e.g., Northcross v. Board of Educ., 466 F.2d 890 (6th Cir.), stay denied, 409 U.S. 909
(1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 926 (1973); Brown v. Board of Educ., 464 F.2d 382 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 981 (1972); Acree v. County Bd. of Educ., 458 F.2d 486 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 1006 (1972); Brewer v. School Bd., 456 F.2d 943 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 892
(1972); Dandridge v. Jefferson Parish School Bd., 456 F.2d 552 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
978 (1972); Monroe v. Board of Comm'rs, 453 F.2d 259 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 945
(1972); Clark v. Board of Educ., 449 F.2d 493 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 936 (1972);
United States v. Watson Chapel School Dist. No. 24,446 F.2d 933 (8th Cir. 1971), cert denied, 404
U.S. 1059 (1972); Adams v. School Dist. No. 5, 444 F.2d 99 (4th Cir.), stay denied, 404 U.S. 1221,
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 912 (1971); Davis v. School Dist. of Pontiac, 443 F.2d 573 (6th Cir. 1970),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 913 (1971); United States v. Texas, 321 F. Supp. 1043 (E.D. Tex. 1970), stupp.
neni, 330 F. Supp. 235 (1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1016, stay denied, 404 U.S. 1206 (1972). But
see Pate v. Dade County School Bd., 434 F.2d 1151 (5th Cir. 1970), a 'd, 447 F.2d 150 (5th Cir.
1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1064 (1972).
262. Adams v. Evansville-Vandenburgh School Corp., 409 U.S. 1060 (1972); Harrington v.
Colquitt County Bd. of Educ., 460 F.2d 1191 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 915 (1972).
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shakier, with a tendency to treat them as if they were the same, ie.,
calling for judicial integration,263 just as resegregation after desegrega-
tion called for judicial intervention. 2 4
Further attempts at evasive devices by school boards and state legis-
latures proved unfruitful. The courts forestalled sales of public schools
to all-white private academies, 265 and denied tax-exempt status to pri-
vate segregated schools. 266 If achievement tests resulted in segregating
classrooms in desegregated schools, they were illegal segregative de-
vices. 267  And, of course, the courts held state antibusing laws
unconstitutional.268
Xv.
It is not quite clear whether Milliken v. Bradley269 should be re-
garded as the fifth story on an evergrowing Supreme Court structure of
school desegregation or as an undermining of its foundation. At the
time of its decision, Mr. Justice Marshall, speaking for four members of
the Court, asserted that, "After 20 years of small, often difficult steps
toward that great end," which he described as nothing less than "mak-
ing 'a living truth' of our constitutional ideal of equal justice under
law," "the Court today takes a giant step backwards. 27 ° If so, it could
hardly have come as a complete surprise to the Justices who had bat-
tled to a four-to-four tie in the Richmond case. 27t Richmond, moreover,
263. Johnson v. Combs, 471 F.2d 814 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 413 U.S. 922 (1973); Cis-
neros v. Corpus Christi Ind. School Dist., 467 F.2d 142 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 413 U.S. 920,
922 (1973); United States v. Board of Educ., 459 F.2d 720 (10th Cir.), vacated, 409 U.S. 823 (1972);
California v. San Diego Unified School Dist., 19 Cal. App. 3d 252, 96 Cal. Rptr. 658 (1971), cert.
denied, 405 U.S. 1016 (1972).
264. Stout v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 466 F.2d 1213 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411
U S. 930 (1973); Dowell v. Board of Educ., 465 F.2d 1012 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1041
(1972); Ellis v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 465 F.2d 878 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 966
(1973); Flex v. Potts, 464 F.2d 865 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1007 (1972).
265. McNeal v. Tate County School Dist., 460 F.2d 568 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 413 U.S.
922 (1973); Wright v. City of Brighton, 441 F.2d 447 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 915 (1971).
266. Green v. Connelly, 330 F. Supp. 1150 (D.D.C. 1970), af'd, 404 U.S. 997 (1972).
267. Moses v. Washington Parish School Bd., 456 F.2d 1285 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
1013 (1972).
268. Strout v. Jefferson City Bd. of Educ., 466 F.2d 1213 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S.
92: (1973).
269. 418 U.S. 717 (1973), on remand. 402 F. Supp. 1096 (E.D. Mich. 1975), afid, 540 F.2d 229
(6th Cir. 1976), qtJ'd, 433 U.S. 267 (1977).
270. Id. at 782 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
271. School Bd. v. State Bd. of Educ., 412 U.S. 92 (1973). See notes 231-35 supra and accom-
panying text.
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arose in a de jure state, whereas Milliken was a northern variety case
closer in its alleged violations to Keyes than Swann. But it is under-
standable that Milliken was a great disappointment to the dissenters,
for it marked the first Supreme Court school case decided by opinion in
which a majority of the Court had denied relief requested by NAACP
plaintiffs. If it was the first, it was one of very few. The NAACP hold
on the Supreme Court had been broken here or in Richmond, but it
would ultimately, if not immediately, be restored.
The decision was, of course, not a reversal of any earlier one. At
most, it was a refusal to take the Court's desegregation cases beyond
Keyes. To this extent, it may be that Mill/iken did not add that addi-
tional story to the desegregation building. On the other hand, what it
did was instruct the lower courts on what findings they should make to
justify the kind of multidistrict remedy that was rejected in Milliken.
The lower courts took full advantage of this guidance.
272
The suit in Milliken, like that in Richmond, originated as a suit to
desegregate a central city school system, which was fast becoming an
island of black students surrounded by a ring of white suburban school
districts. The violations on which the original suit rested were racial
gerrymander, site-selection and construction, and pupil assignments ex-
actly of the kind represented by the Park Hill district in Keyes and
there found to be de jure segregation. The trouble was that these prov-
able violations were committed in Detroit by the Detroit school board,
which was to turn from a defendant into a plaintiff in an attempt to use
white suburban students to effectuate a desired racial mix in Detroit. It
was quite clear that Detroit, like other major metropolitan school dis-
tricts, did not have enough white students in its own system to bring
about the desired result. As the Chief Justice, writing for the five-man
majority, said:
Viewing the record as a whole, it seems clear that the District Court
and the Court of Appeals shifted the primary focus from a Detroit rem-
edy to the metropolitan area only because of their conclusion that total
desegregation of Detroit would not produce the racial balance which they
perceived as desirable. Both courts proceeded on an assumption that the
Detroit schools could not be truly desegregated-in their view of what
constituted desegregation-unless the racial composition of the student
body of each school substantially reflected the racial composition of the
272. See note 340 infra.
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population of the metropolitan area as a whole.273
The Chief Justice reasserted his proposition that racial balance was
not the measure of desegregation. 274 The lower court was not free to
erase the school district boundaries and restructure local school board
jurisdictions. Local control of education was too important and too
well imbedded in our educational customs to be so lightly ignored.275
Lest anyone should think, however, that the restructuring of local gov-
ernment was beyond the ken of the federal judicial power, the Court
asserted: "Of course, no state law is above the Constitution. School
district lines and the present laws with respect to local control, are not
sacrosanct and if they conflict with the Fourteenth Amendment federal
courts have a duty to prescribe adequate remedies. 2 76 And so, the
Court would look, "for the first time, [at] the validity of a remedy man-
dating cross-district or interdistrict consolidation to a remedy of segre-
gation found to exist in only one district. 2
77
The Court then proceeded to announce a standard that made the
question a rhetorical one. If segregation was found in only one district,
there could be no interdistrict remedy.
The controlling principle consistently expounded in our holdings is that
the scope of the remedy is determined by the nature and extent of the
constitutional violation. . . . Before the boundaries of separate and au-
tonomous school districts may be set aside by consolidating the separate
units for remedial purposes or by imposing a cross-district remedy, it
must first be shown that there has been a constitutional violation within
one district that produces a significant segregative effect in another dis-
trict. Specifically, it must be shown that racially discriminatory acts of the
state or local school districts, or of a single school district have been a
substantial cause of interdistrict segregation .... without any interdis-
trict violation and interdistrict effect, there is no constitutional wrong call-
ing for an interdistrict remedy. 27 s
For the majority, the record was bare of evidence of such "constitu-
tional wrongs." There was evidence only of violations of the Constitu-
tion by the Detroit board within its own district. The Court rejected
the notion that because of the state's involvement in local education by
273. 418 U.S. at 739-40.
274. Id. at 740-41.
275. Id. at 741.
276. Id. at 744.
277. Id.
278. Id. at 744-45.
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control over financing and site-selection, the state, too, was guilty of
segregative acts or, if it were, that its conduct justified an interdistrict
remedy.279 Nor did one or two isolated instances in which one or an-
other of the suburban districts might be implicated suffice to justify an
interdistrict remedy.280 The proposed remedy affected fifty-eight dis-
tricts, not one or two of three.
The Chief Justice defined the right and remedy involved:
The constitutional right of the Negro respondent residing in Detroit is
to attend a unitary school system in that district .... The view of the
dissenters, that the existence of a dual system in Detroit can be made the
basis for a decree requiring cross-district transportation of pupils, cannot
be supported on the grounds that it represents merely the devising of a
suitably flexible remedy for the violation of rights already established by
our prior decisions. It can be supported only by drastic expansion of the
constitutional right itself, and expansion without any support in either
constitutional principle or precedent.28'
All that the Chief Justice said may have been true. Neither substan-
tive rule nor remedial decree by way of precedent could justify the
judgment of the court below. The difficulty was that it equally could be
said of each step the Court took-from Brown to Green, from Green to
Swann, and from Swann to Keyes-that the latter decision was "with-
out any support in either constitutional principle or precedent." That
was the nature of the desegregation cases from the beginning; they es-
chewed principle and avoided precedent. And so, it could be said of
Milliken, too, that if there was neither principle nor precedent in sup-
port of interdistrict relief, there was no principle or precedent that fore-
closed such relief. The Court, in its legislative mode, simply decided to
draw the line at this point. It was simply a matter of counting judicial
votes, as it had been for twenty years.
Mr. Justice Stewart in concurrence, after joining the Court's opinion,
asserted that what was at issue was not constitutional law but remedy,
because there was a "finding of a violation of the Equal Protection
Clause"2 2 with which there was no quarrel. "The courts [below] were
in error for the simple reason that the remedy they thought necessary
was not commensurate with the constitutional violation found."283
279. Id. at 750-51.
280. Id. at 750.
281. Id. at 746-47.
282. Id. at 753.
283. Id. at 754.
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Had the state, to support "separation of the races, ' 28 4 drawn or
redrawn the school district lines, or transferred students between school
districts, or purposefully discriminated by use of state housing or zon-
ing, an interdistrict remedy might be warranted. "In this case, how-
ever, no such interdistrict violation was shown. 2 s5  Mr. Justice
Stewart's strong attack on the Marshall dissent reveals the plastic na-
ture of both fact and law as treated by the highest court in the land:
My Brother MARSHALL seems to ignore this fundamental fact when he
states, post, at 799, that "the most essential finding [made by the District
Court] was that Negro children in Detroit had been confined by inten-
tional acts of segregation to a growing core of Negro schools surrounded
by a receding ring of white schools." This conclusion is simply not sub-
stantiated by the record presented in this case. The record here does sup-
port the claim made by the respondents that white and Negro students
within Detroit who otherwise would have attended school together were
separated by acts of the State or its subdivision. However, segregative
acts within the city alone cannot be presumed to have produced-and no
factual showing was made that they did produce-an increase in the
number of Negro students in the city as a whole. It is this essential fact of
a predominantly Negro school population in Detroit--caused by un-
known and perhaps unknowable factors such as in-migration, birth rates,
economic changes, or cumulative acts of private racial fears-that ac-
counts for the "growing core of Negro schools," a "core" that has grown
to include virtually the entire city. The Constitution simply does not al-
low federal courts to attempt to change that situation unless and until it is
shown that the State, or its political subdivisions, have contributed to
cause the situation to exist. No record has been made in this case showing
that the racial composition of the Detroit school population or that resi-
dential patterns within Detroit and in the surrounding areas were in any
significant measure caused by governmental activity, and it follows that
the situation over which my dissenting Brothers express concern cannot
serve as the predicate for the remedy adopted by the District Court and
approved by the Court of Appeals.286
If "judicial restraint" was the mark of the majority opinions in Milli-
ken, hyperbole was the cachet of the dissenters, as it so frequently is.
Mr. Justice Douglas combined the majority judgment here with the de-
cision in San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez287 to assert that the
284. Id. at 755.
285. Id.
286. Id. at 756 n.2.
287. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
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blacks would be set "back to the period that antedated the separate but
equal regime of Plessy v. Ferguson.'2 88 His reasoning was simple, if
fallacious. Rodriguez refused to command equal state financial support
for all school districts.2"9 The blacks might be isolated in "poor dis-
tricts." The blacks, therefore, would be confined to poorer schools.
The problem with this reasoning is twofold. First, the plaintiffs in Rod-
riguez had rejected the invitation to suggest that the district on whose
behalf they were suing was a racially identifiable district. Rodriguez
did not, of course, hold that racially identifiable districts could be de-
prived of equal support. Second, it is frequently the case that school
districts containing a high proportion of lower economic population
also contain the highest real property tax base. The New York and
Chicago school districts, for example, are not the least benefitted school
districts within each of their states, although they do contain the high-
est concentration of minorities in their states. Nor was Detroit.290
For Douglas, however, it was the condition of segregation-not the
cause of that condition-that was to be abated. And, as he had indi-
cated in Keyes, a state is guilty of either creating segregation or failing
to abate it; in either case it is in violation of the Constitution.29'
Mr. Justice Douglas wrote a solo dissent. Justices White and Mar-
shall wrote dissenting opinions joined by all of their dissenting breth-
ren. Mr. Justice White disposed of the matter essentially by demeaning
the refusal to approve interdistrict relief as based on "administrative
inconvenience to the State. ' 2 92 This justification, of course, carries very
little weight on the scales of judicial discretion.
He further asserted what few lower federal courts have fully appreci-
ated, whether or not their masters have:
The task is not to devise a system of pains and penalties to punish consti-
tutional violations brought to light. Rather, it is to desegregate an educa-
tional system in which the races have been kept apart, without, at the
same time, losing sight of the central educational function of the
schools. 293
White was concerned that there was no internal remedy in Detroit to
288. 418 U.S. at 759.
289. 411 U.S. at 55.
290. Id. at 23, 57. See also Note, 4 Statistical .4nalysis of the School Finance Decisions, On
inning Battles and Losing Wars, 81 YALE L.J. 1303 (1972).
291. 418 U.S. at 761.
292. Id. at 763.
293. Id. at 764 (emphasis in original).
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prevent an ever increasing black school population. He accepted and
seemingly approved of the trial court's concern about "white flight"
and its contribution to that ever increasing concentration of blacks in
the cities. An interdistrict remedy would reverse this trend; and he
could not see why the alleged "administrative difficulties" that Michi-
gan would face should be a barrier to the only measure that would
alleviate racial concentration in the Detroit schools. It is the state that
is responsible under the fourteenth amendment for its own acts and
those of its subordinate bodies. There is no reason why the federal
courts should be limited in their compulsion on the state to do what the
state is perfectly capable of doing.
Mr. Justice White closed by coming out where Mr. Justice Douglas
did: "Ultimately,. . . [the Court] is unresponsive to the goal of attain-
ing the utmost actual desegregation consistent with restraints of practi-
cability and thus augurs the frequent frustration of the remedial powers
of the federal courts." '2 94 For White, as probably for all four dissenters,
although Mr. Justice Brennan never said so in his own words, it is the
condition of separation that is the constitutional violation to be abated,
and the federal courts alone were the ones who could do so if they did
not frustrate their own ambitions for hegemony.
Mr. Justice Marshall's opinion was a long lament for the topping off
of a structure in whose construction he played so major a role, first as
advocate for the black school children, then as advocate for the Gov-
ernment, and finally as judicial creator. His frustration at the failure of
the Court to take the next step after Keyes apparently caused him to
conclude that the Court was indulging the sin of conforming to public
opinion rather than flouting it:
Desegregation is not and was never expected to be an easy task. Racial
attitudes ingrained in our Nation's childhood and adolescence are not
quickly thrown aside in its middle years. But just as the inconvenience of
some cannot be allowed to stand in the way of the rights of others, so
public opposition, no matter how strident, cannot be permitted to divert
this Court from the enforcement of the constitutional principles at issue in
this case. Today's holding, I fear, is more a reflection of a perceived pub-
lic mood that we have gone far enough in enforcing the Constitution's
guarantee of equal justice than it is the product of neutral principles of
law. In the short run, it may seem to be the easier course to allow our
great metropolitan areas to be divided up each into two cities-one white,
294. Id. at 781.
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the other black-but it is a course, I predict, our people wiU ultimately
regret.
295
The self-righteousness and the certainty of both majority and dissent
that they alone understood the Constitution's mandate and were apply-
ing "neutral principles of law" was not unique to this case. It was just a
little surprising that Thurgood Marshall would invoke the concept of
"neutral principles" after the treatment given Professor Wechsler for
his suggestion that "neutral principles" should control in desegregation
cases.
2 96
XVI.
The attempts to effect so-called metropolitan area desegregation
plans were due, in part, to the difficulties encountered in single-district
desegregation where immediately adjacent areas were available for es-
cape by white students who had to be kept in the system if meaningful
racial mix were to be accomplished within the system. The central cit-
ies' school systems were turning black without regard to desegregation
plans. The rush to the suburbs of the middle class, essentially white at
the beginning but now including blacks if at a smaller rate, was a post-
World War II phenomenon that preceded as well as followed Brown.
The desire for a more healthful environment, for better housing in one-
family units rather than in apartments, for escape from dirt, crime, and
violence, all contributed to a very large exodus of the middle class.
There can be little doubt, however, that the immediate threat of deseg-
regation and the effectuation of a decree was also a cause of what came
to be called "white flight."
The courts were not very clear about where to place white flight on
the scales used in the exercise of their discretion. It was usually said
that the threat of white flight was insufficient reason for a less onerous
decree, and most courts took the risk that white flight would leave the
cities with large numbers of one-race (black) schools. The hope for
metropolitan plans was that they would prescribe a whole arc around
the city so that escape by moving to the suburbs would become impos-
sible. This explains the Richmond plan's inclusion of all of two coun-
ties, Henrico and Chesterfield, within the program. It explains the
295. Id. at 814-15.
296. See Wechsler, Toward Neutral Princples of Constitutional Law, 73 HARv. L. REv. 1
(1959). See also Pollak, Racial Discrimination and Judicial Integrity:.4 Reply to Professor Wechs.
ler, 108 U. PA. L. REv. 1 (1959).
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Detroit plan's requirement for participation by almost sixty nearby
suburban school systems. It explains the Wilmington plan's combina-
tion of the school districts of all northern Delaware, encompassing
more than half the students in the entire state.
There was, however, another escape hatch-the removal of students
not from the geographical area, but within the geographical area to
nonpublic schools. The major cities of the North had extensive paro-
chial school systems already in existence. And the experience in Bos-
ton showed that these would certainly be used to avoid busing into
central city schools, whatever the professions of the local Catholic hier-
archy not to allow their schools to be used for this purpose. The growth
of private academies, however, was not confined to religiously affiliated
schools, and attempts were made to reduce the attractiveness of this
potential for avoidance of public school desegregation.
The grossness of the State's behavior in the Grffin case297 was both
easy and groundbreaking. State-supported private schools would not
be allowed to be used to break the back of a desegregation plan. In
Norwood v. Harrison,298 the Court sealed another leak. Since 1940,
Mississippi provided for the loan of textbooks to both public and pri-
vate school students. The Supreme Court had sustained the validity of
similar loans when attacked on the ground that they violated the estab-
lishment clause of the first amendment.299 The question raised in Nor-
wood was whether similar assistance to students attending private
schools that discriminated on the basis of race violated the equal pro-
tection clause. The Court held that it did.3° All of the Justices agreed.
Seven joined in the opinion by Chief Justice Burger. Justices Douglas
and Brennan concurred in the result without opinion, perhaps re-
senting the Court's distinction of the parochial school cases in lieu of
holding that loans to either religious or discriminatory private schools
were valid.
The Chief Justice began his opinion by noting that, "Private schools
in Mississippi have experienced a marked growth in recent years. 30 1
Catholic schools aside, there were in 1963-64 only 17 private schools
with 2,632 students in Mississippi. By September 1970, there were 155
297. Griffin v. School Bd., 377 U.S. 218 (1963). See text accompanying notes 116-24 supra.
298. 413 U.S. 455 (1973).
299. See, e.g., Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
300. 413 U.S. at 466.
301. Id. at 457.
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such schools with an enrollment of 42,000.302
The Court pointed out that there was no question raised in this case
about the right to maintain a private school with admission limited by
race, national origin, or religion. The trial court had sustained the stat-
ute on the ground that it was not racially motivated, as evidenced by its
enactment in 1940, and that it came within the rationale of the Court's
religious school-textbook case.303 The Supreme Court first disposed of
a straw man argument that the Constitution compelled the loan of text-
books to private school students if it lent them to public school stu-
dents. It then stated that the textbook loan program was not
distinguishable from the tuition grant or loan programs, which the
lower federal courts had long since held invalid with the Supreme
Court's approval.3°
The constitutional violation lay in the fact that the textbook program
provided substantial assistance to private schools that were free to dis-
criminate on the basis of race. The fact that the public schools of the
state had been given a clean bill of health and found to be unitary was
irrelevant. Like freedom of religion, "Invidious private discrimination
may be characterized as a form of exercising freedom of association
protected by the First Amendment. . ."; unlike freedom of religion, "it
has never been accorded affirmative constitutional protections. 30 5
This, of course, does not mean that aid should be cut off from all pri-
vate schools but only from those engaged in discrimination on the basis
of race. The Court concluded with a statement that would appear to be
inconsistent with the ruling in Keyes: "No presumptions flow from
mere allegations; no one can be required, consistent with due process,
to prove the absence of violation of law."'30 6 But the difference between
Norwood and Keyes may lie in the fact that state government, unlike
persons and corporations, is not entitled to "due process of law."
Norwood closed a small part of the private academy escape route. In
1974 Gilmore v. City of Montgomery3 °7 closed it a little more. There,
the city parks in Montgomery had been desegregated. The trial court
enjoined the city from permitting the use of the parks by segregated
302. Id.
303. 340 F. Supp. 1003, 1013 (N.D. Miss. 1972), rev'd, 413 U.S. 455 (1973).
304. 413 U.S. at 461-63.
305. Id. at 470.
306. Id. at 471.
307. 417 U.S. 556 (1974).
[Vol. 1979:309
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1979/iss2/2
SCHOOL DESEGREGATION
private school groups as well as other discriminatory membership orga-
nizations. The court of appeals held that the injunction was too broad
because it prevented "It]he freedom to choose one's associates in pri-
vate clubs, churches and civic organizations."3 ° The Supreme Court
spoke through Mr. Justice Blackmun, who had not previously authored
an opinion in the area of school segregation.
Blackmun began his opinion with a statement of principle:
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not
prohibit the "[i]ndividual invasion of individual rights." Civil Rights
Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883). It does proscribe, however, state action "of
every kind" that operates to deny any citizen the equal protection of the
laws. Ibid. This proscription on state action applies defacto as well as de
jure because "[c]onduct that is formally 'private' may become so en-
twined with governmental policies or so impregnated with a governmen-
tal character as to become subject to the constitutional limitations placed
upon state action." Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 299 (1966).3°9
On this basis, the Court held that an injunction against the "exclusive
use" of any public facility by a discriminatory group properly issued:
Here, the city's actions significantly enhanced the attractiveness of seg-
regated private schools, formed in reaction against the federal court
school order, by enabling them to offer complete athletic programs. The
city's provision of stadiums and recreational fields resulted in capital sav-
ings for those schools and enabled them to divert their own funds to other
educational programs. It also provided the opportunity for the schools to
operate concessions that generated revenue .... [T]his assistance signifi-
cantly tended to undermine the federal court order mandating the estab-
lishment and maintenance of a unitary school system in Montgomery. It
therefore was wholly proper for the city to be enjoined from permitting
exclusive access to public recreational facilities by segregated private
schools and by groups affiliated with such schools. 3 10
The Court then found the record inadequate to determine whether
the nonexclusive use of "zoos, museums, parks, and other recreational
facilities by private school groups in common with others. . . involves
government so directly in the actions of those users as to warrant court
intervention on constitutional grounds."33 ' Mr. Justice Blackmun then
laid out a blueprint for plaintiffs' proof of such invalid government par-
308. 473 F.2d 832, 839 (5th Cir. 1973), rep'dinpart, 417 U.S. 556 (1974).
309. 417 U.S. at 565.
310. Id. at 569.
311. Id. at 570.
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ticipation. He concluded with a warning that even bigots are entitled to
the constitutional freedom of association. Thus, "a person's mere
membership in an organization which possesses a discriminatory ad-
missions policy would not alone be ground for his exclusion from pub-
lic facilities."3 2 Having given this much, however, he retracted even
more:
W]e must also be aware that the very exercise of the freedom to associate
by some may serve to infringe that freedom for others. Invidious discrim-
ination takes its own toll on the freedom to associate, and it is not subject
to affirmative constitutional protection when it involves state action. 313
Mr. Justice Marshall would have left the entire matter "to the sound
discretion of the District Court Judge who has lived with this case for
so many years and who has a much better appreciation both of the
extent to which these . . . matters are actual problems in the city of
Montgomery and of the need for injunctive relief. '314
Justices White and Douglas would "enjoin all school-sponsored and
school-directed nonexclusive uses of municipal recreational facili-
ties. 31 5 Mr. Justice Brennan would not go that far:
Private segregated schools are not likely to maintain their own zoos, mu-
seums, or nature walks. Consequently, permitting segregated schools to
take their students on field trips to city facilities of that kind would not
result in a direct financial benefit to the schools themselves. An injunc-
tion against use by segregated schools of such city facilities would be ap-
propriate, in my view, only if the District Court should find that the relief
is necessary to insure full effectuation of the Montgomery desegregation
decrees.316
The Court's big step toward closing down the private academies es-
cape route came in a case resting not on the Constitution, but on the
Civil Rights Act of 1866, as now found in Title 42 of the United States
Code, section 1981. In Runyon v. McCrary,3 17 the Court ruled that the
statute forbade a private academy from excluding blacks because of
their race. Mr. Justice Stewart wrote the Court's opinion.
When black parents applied for admission of their children to pri-
312. Id. at 575.
313. Id.
314. Id. at 577 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). See text accompany-
ing notes 138-39 infra.
315. Id. at 578.
316. Id.
317. 427 U.S. 160 (1976).
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vate schools, school officials informed them that the schools limited
their student body to whites. The lower court held that the schools'
refusal to enter into contracts with the applicants violated the 1866 stat-
ute's grant of the right to contract.31  At the beginning of his opinion,
Mr. Justice Stewart narrowed its focus:
It is worth noting at the outset some of the questions that these cases do
not present. They do not present any question of the right of a private
social organization to limit its membership on racial or any other
grounds. They do not present any question of the right of a private school
to limit its student body to boys, to girls, or to adherents of a particular
religious faith, since 42 U.S.C. § 1981 is in no way addressed to such cate-
gories of selectivity. They do not even present the application of § 1981 to
private sectarian schools that practice racial exclusion on religious
grounds. Rather, these cases present only two basic questions: whether
§ 1981 prohibits private, commercially operated, nonsectarian schools
from denying admission to prospective students because they are Ne-
groes, and, if so, whether that federal law is constitutional .... 319
However erroneous they may have been,320 earlier decisions of the
Court, particularly Jones v. Alfred . Mayer Co.,321 established the
principle that the 1964 statute establishes not only the right to make
contracts, but the duty to enter into contracts with blacks in the same
way as with whites. Thus, there was nothing left to do here except to
determine whether the imposition of that duty on the private academies
would violate their constitutional rights.
Mr. Justice Stewart found no right of association infringed by section
1981.
[Ilt may be assumed that parents have a First Amendment right to send
their children to educational institutions that promote the belief that ra-
cial segregation is desirable, and that the children have an equal right to
attend such institutions. But it does not follow that the practice of exclud-
ing racial minorities from such institutions is also protected by the same
principle.322
This is a strange rule to derive from the argument about association-
that there is freedom to preach it, but not to practice it.
318. 515 F.2d 1082, 1087 (4th Cir. 1975), aft'd, 427 U.S. 160 (1976).
319. 427 U.S. at 167-68 (footnotes omitted).
320. See, e.g., C. FAIRMAN, RECONSTRUCTIONAL REUNION 1207-58 (1971); Casper, Jones v.
Majer: Clio, Bemused and Confused Muse, 1968 SUP. CT. REv. 89.
321. 392 U.S. 409, 441-43 n.78 (1967). See also Johnson v. Railway Exp. Agency, 421 U.S.
454, 459-60 (1975); Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Ass'n, 410 U.S. 431, 439-40 (1973).
322. 427 U.S. at 176.
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Since there is a right to preach and teach segregation, and the schools
involved are free to do so even after admission of blacks, there is no
infringement of parents' rights as declared in Meyer v. Nebraska, 23
Pierce v. Society of Sisters,12 or Wisconsin v. Yoder.325 But apparently,
parents' rights concerning the schooling of their children are confined
to those delineated in these cases. There is no right to privacy invaded
here. Although the statute's application to the right of admission of
black students does "implicate [white] parental interests," parents' pri-
vacy interests are constitutionally confined to their "child-bearing" de-
cisions and their freedom to make them.32 6 Thus, the right to contract
created by section 1981 can be fully implemented by compelling the
admission of black students to all-white schools on the same condi-
tions-provided they are not racial-as whites.
Justices Powell, Stevens, White, and Rehnquist formed a peculiar
minority. Apparently, they were all convinced "that § 1981 was not
intended to restrict private contractual choices." 327 But the Court al-
ready construed the statute that way and for Justices Powell and Ste-
vens that construction was binding. Mr. Justice Powell felt it necessary
to reject the position of dissenting Justices White and Rehnquist that
the decision implies "the intrusive investigation into the motives of
every refusal to contract by a private citizen."32 For Powell, "[t]he
case presented on the record before us does not involve . . .[a] per-
sonal contractual relationship. '329 He would draw a distinction, al-
though neither the majority opinion nor the precedents that he found
controlling suggest it, that:
§ 1981, as interpreted by our prior decisions, does reach certain acts of
racial discrimination that are "private" in the sense that they involve no
state action. But choices, including those involved in entering into a con-
tract, that are "private" in the sense that they are not part of a commercial
relationship offered generally or widely, and that reflect the selectivity ex-
ercised by an individual entering into a personal relationship, certainly
were never intended to be restricted by the 19th century Civil Rights Acts.
The open offer to the public generally involved in the cases before us is
323. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
324. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
325. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
326. 427 U.S. at 170.
327. Id. at 186 (Powel, J., concurring).
328. Id. at 187.
329. Id. at 188.
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simply not a "private" contract in this sense.330
It is appropriate to note, first, that Mr. Justice Powell retreats to the
intention of the framers of the 1866 legislation to sustain his conclu-
sion, although he conceded that the framers' intention probably was
inconsistent with the Court's earlier interpretations of the statute that
had brought him to concur. Second, this position was personal. He
obviously had not persuaded the majority to buy it. Mr. Justice Stevens
revealed a commitment to stare decisis that is rarely seen among the
Justices of recent years. "For me," he wrote, "the problem in these
cases is whether to follow a line of authority which I firmly believe to
have been incorrectly decided."33' But,
[for the Court now to overrule Jones [the erroneous precedent] would be
a significant step backwards, with effects that would not have arisen from
a correct decision in the first instance. Such a step would be so clearly
contrary to my understanding of the mores of today and I think the Court
is entirely correct in adhering to [precedent].332
One cannot help but wonder what Mr. Justice Stevens would have
done had he been faced with deciding the Brown case. The "errone-
ous" precedents there-the school segregation cases resting on Plessy-
would, if his reasoning in Runvon is correct, have foreclosed his joining
the majority.
Mr. Justice White's dissenting opinion, joined by Mr. Justice Rehn-
quist, rehearsed the evidence of clear error in the earlier decisions on
which the Court rested here. His argument is telling and unrefuted.
Moreover, the precedent established the meaning of section 1982. As
he noted, the section 1982 precedent "is a Thirteenth Amendment stat-
ute under which the Congress may and did seek to reach private con-
duct, at least with respect to sales of real estate. The latter [§ 1981] is a
Fourteenth Amendment statute under which the Congress may and did
reach only state action. 333
The Court apparently saw this argument as it was seen by Mr. Jus-
tice Stevens-a distinction without a difference. In any event, it was
Mr. Justice Stewart who had written the opinion in Jones. There is
nothing so telling in argument to a Supreme Court Justice as a prece-
dent of his own making. Admission of error is certainly too much to
330. Id. at 189.
331. 427 U.S. at 189 (Stevens, J., concurring).
332. Id. at 191-92.
333. 427 U.S. at 213 (White, J., dissenting).
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expect from the biggest of men.334
Whether the opening of private academies to blacks as well as whites
will have the effect of cutting back on white flight from desegregated
school systems remains to be seen. There is no requirement in Runyon
to afford scholarships; it may well be that the judgment affords only an
escape mechanism for middle-class blacks as well as middle-class
whites. And that, too, has been the result of the growing movement of
middle-class blacks to the suburbs. Mr. Justice Douglas' concern in
Milliken,335 that desegregated city school systems will encompass only
the poor who cannot escape either to private schools or to the suburbs,
may well prove true. The proposal of the Internal Revenue Service to
deny tax-exempt status to private schools discriminating on the basis of
race336 will only make such schools more expensive, thus exacerbating
the problem for those who must move if they lose the choice of a pro-
prietary school.
XVII.
Meanwhile, the judicial desegregation process went forward in the
lower courts. The Supreme Court declined to interfere,337 even where
substantial numbers of all black schools remained extant under the
plan,338 or where the trial and appellate courts ignored the Keyes-Mili-
ken requirements of matching remedy to violation.339
The lower courts had no difficulty finding bases for interdistrict seg-
regation despite the strictures of Milliken and without Supreme Court
334. But see Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 634 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
335. See notes 288-296 supra and accompanying text.
336. Proposed Revenue Procedure on Private Tax-Exempt Schools, 43 Fed. Reg. 37296 (1976)
(to be codified in I.R.C. § 501(c)(3)).
337. See Eller v. Vaughans, 414 U.S. 999 (1973) (denying certiorari); Board of Educ. v.
Vaughans, 414 U.S. 999 (1973) (denying certiorari); United States v. Texas Educ. Agency, 512
F.2d 896 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 837 (1975); Carr v. Montgomery County Bd. of
Educ., 511 F.2d 1374 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 986 (1975); Kalamazoo Bd. of Educ. v.
Oliver, 508 F.2d 178 (6th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 963 (1975); Mapp v. Board of Educ.,
477 F.2d 851 (6th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1022 (1977).
338. See Mapp v. Board of Educ., 525 F.2d 169 (6th Cir. 1975), cer. denied, 427 U.S. 911
(1975); Northcross v. Board of Educ., 489 F.2d 15 (6th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 962 (1974);
Goss v. Board of Educ., 482 F.2d 1044 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1171 (1973),
339. See, e.g., Morgan v. Kerrigan, 530 F.2d 401 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 935 (1976);
Brinkman v. Giligan, 518 F.2d 853 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1000 (1975); Morgan v. Kerri-
gan, 509 F.2d 580 (Ist Cir. 1974). ceri. denied, 421 U.S. 963 (1975).
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review.340 Moreover, if as the Supreme Court indicated, segregative
intent is a necessary element for de jure segregation, the courts of ap-
peals found that intent may be derived from the segregative effects,341
thus making a perfect circle.
Busing still had to be pushed,342 although in a demonstration of im-
partiality one court chose those to be bused on the basis of random
selection. 43 Recalcitrant school districts protected by idiosyncratic dis-
trict court judges still had to be brought into line 4.3  The rules created
to protect black children against discrimination were extended to His-
panics.345 Indians were barred from claiming a right to separate
schools. 346 The lower courts protected their own jurisdiction by hold-
ing that local boards had standing to enjoin state boards from transfer-
ring students,347 and by enjoining state court procedures that would
attack federal court decrees.348
Earlier Supreme Court decisions were given more sway than some of
those to which the lower courts took no liking. Courts forbade text-
book loans to segregated schools,349 stopped the attempted creation of a
new school district to avoid desegregation 35°--gerrymandering is al-
lowed only for one side of the controversy-and held that racial bal-
ance among faculty justified even the replacement of a black principal
by a white one.35' The power of the federal court to fix tax rates as part
340. See, e.g., Board of Educ. v. Newburg Area Council, Inc., 421 U.S. 931 (1975) (denying
certiorari); United States v. Missouri, 515 F.2d 1365 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 951 (1975);
United States v. Board of School Comm'rs, 503 F.2d 68 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 929
(1975); Evans v. Buchanan, 393 F. Supp. 428 (D. Del.), afd on rehearing, 423 U.S. 963 (1975).
341. See United States v. School Dist. of Omaha, 521 F.2d 530 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 946 (1975); Morales v. Shannon, 516 F.2d 411 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1034 (1975).
But see Soria v. Oxnard School Dist., 488 F.2d 579 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 951
(1974).
342. Medley v. School Bd., 482 F.2d 1061 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1171 (1973).
343. Farha v. Unified School Dist. No. 259, 414 U.S. 1091 (1973).
344. See, e.g.. Tasby v. Estes, 517 F.2d 92 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 930 (1975).
345. United States v. Midland Ind. School Dist., 519 F.2d 60 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424
U.S. 910 (1976).
346. Geraud v. Schrader, 531 P.2d 872 (Wyo.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 904 (1975).
347. See, e.g., State Bd. of Educ. v. Akron Bd. of Educ., 490 F.2d 1285 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
417 U.S. 932 (1974).
348. See Kershaw v. Brooks, 414 U.S. 824 (1973) (denying certiorari).
349. Graham v. Evangeline Parish School Bd., 484 F.2d 649 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416
U.S. 970 (1974).
350. United States v. Saluda County School Dist., 488 F.2d 804 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
417 U.S. 912 (1974).
351. Board of Educ. v. Dowell, 423 U.S. 824 (1975) (denying certiorari).
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of the desegregation power was accepted by the Court, but over the
expressed wish of the Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Powell to hold
hearings on the question.3 5 2 The power to withhold HEW funds went
without saying. 3
XVIII.
Whatever fears Milliken354 evoked that the Court was reversing its
direction in school desegregation cases seemed to be confirmed by the
Court's decision in Pasadena City Board of Education v. Spangler,35'
decided in June of 1976. Only Justices Brennan and Marshall
dissented.
Private parties had brought suit in 1968 to desegregate the high
schools of the Pasadena Unified School District. The United States in-
tervened and was successful in broadening the case to include all the
schools of the system. In 1970 the trial court approved a desegregation
plan.3 5 6 There was no appeal. In ordering the creation of the plan, the
trial court demanded that "[t]he plan shall provide for student assign-
ments in such a manner that. . . there shall be no school in the District
• . . with a majority of any minority students. ' 3 7 The plan that went
into effect in 1970 conformed with that injunction.
Four years later, the school board went to court seeking to be re-
lieved of "the requirement that there be 'no school in the District, ele-
mentary or junior high or senior high school, with a majority of any
minority student.'"358 Following the 1970-71 initiation of the plan, a
black majority emerged at one school in 1971-72, in four schools in
1972-73, and in five schools by the time of the hearing:
[T]here was. . . no showing. . . that those post-1971 changes in the ra-
cial mix of some Pasadena schools . . . were in any manner caused by
segregative actions chargeable to the defendants. The District Court re-
jected petitioners' assertion that the movement was caused by so-called
"white flight" traceable to the decree itself. It stated that the "trends evi-
denced in Pasadena closely approximate the state-wide trends in Califor-
nia schools, both segregated and desegregated." . . . [The changes in the
352. United States v. Missouri, 515 F.2d 1365 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 951 (1975).
353. HEW v. Ferndale School Dist., 414 U.S. 824 (1973) (denying certiorari).
354. See notes 269-96 supra and accompanying text.
355. 427 U.S. 424 (1976).
356. 311 F. Supp. 501 (C.D. Cal. 1970).
357. Id. at 505.
358. 427 U.S. at 429.
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school mix] apparently resulted from people randomly moving into, out
of, and around the [Pasadena] area. This quite normal pattern of human
migration resulted in some change in the demographics of Pasadena's res-
idential patterns, with resulting shifts in the racial makeup of some
schools.
359
The Court ruled that in the absence of segregative actions on the part
of the school board, there was no basis for holding the board responsi-
ble for the increase of blacks in some schools, quoting from Swann that
"[n]either school authorities nor district courts are constitutionally re-
quired to make year-by-year adjustments of the racial composition of
student bodies once the affirmative duty to desegregate has been ac-
complished and racial discrimination through official action is elimi-
nated from the system. 360
The trial court had asserted that the school system had not yet been
desegregated, largely because of the failure to reassign students each
year to assure that every school had a white majority or plurality.36'
But the Supreme Court held that requirement invalid: "[W]e think that
in enforcing its order so as to require annual readjustment of attend-
ance zones so that there would not be a majority of any minority in any
Pasadena public school, the District Court exceeded its authority. 362
This requirement for annual revision, the Court indicated, would be
invalid even where a unitary system had not been attained on the insti-
tution of the plan.363
The issue was a narrow one. There could be little doubt, however,
that at an earlier day, the result probably would have been different.
Certainly before Swan, if not later, the trial court's decision to compel
continued reassignments to maintain racial balance, once a predicate of
constitutional violation was established in the first place, would have
been regarded as a matter of judicial discretion. And, indeed, this is
where Justices Marshall and Brennan still thought it belonged.36
Pasadena was followed by a series of cases that gave cold comfort to
359. Id. at 435-36.
360. Id. at 436 (quoting Swam v. Board of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 31-32 (1971)).
361. 311 F. Supp. at 522.
362. 427 U.S. at 435.
363. Id. at 438 n.5.
364. By way of a parting gesture, Mr. Justice Marshall gave a reading to the Rehnquist opin-
ion not supported by the Rehnquist text. Id. at 444 n.2. Marshall contended that Rehnquist
would have regarded the case differently had the demographic changes been attributable to "white
flight" from the desegregation decree. This conclusion is based solely on the language quoted
upra note 359 and accompanying text, which hardly sustains his reading.
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those who recalled the unchanging line of successes from Brown
through Swann and up to Milliken. But in a second run at Milliken,365
the Court expanded the area of discretionary control of the trial courts
over the content of the educational program to be adopted by a school
system under a desegregation decree. In Milliken 11, in an opinion by
Chief Justice Burger in which all but Mr. Justice Powell joined, the
Court ruled that "a District Court can, as part of a desegregation de-
cree, order compensatory or remedial educational programs for school-
children who have been subject to past acts of defjure segregation" and
may "require state officials found responsible for constitutional viola-
tions to bear part of the costs of these programs." 366
Plaintiffs, on the remand of Milliken 1, submitted a Detroit-only plan
limited to pupil reassignment and calling for each school to have a stu-
dent composition within 15% of the racial ratio of the district as a
whole. (The whole school district was 71.5% black, 26.4% white, and
2.1% other.) The Detroit school board's competing plan called for the
elimination of any identifiably white school, assurance of some neigh-
borhood schooling for every child, and less busing than plaintiffs plan.
In addition, the board inserted thirteen compensatory educational pro-
grams in the plan. The State Board of Education was particularly
laudatory about the proposed in-service training and guidance and
counseling components. The trial court, after hearings, approved the
Detroit board's plan, as it emerged with four educational components:
reading, in-service training, testing, and counseling and career gui-
dance. The district court said "that it had 'been careful to order only
what is essential for a school district undergoing desegregation.' "367
The additional programs were to be paid for equally by the Detroit
school board and the state defendants.
The Supreme Court admitted the novelty of the issue, but had no
difficulty in finding authority for "remedial educational programs as
part of a school desegregation decree" 368 in such earlier generaliza-
tions of its own as that in Brown II, holding that in "fashioning
and effectuating the [desegregation] decrees, the courts will be guided
by equitable principles. '369 It would be difficult to think of court ac-
365. Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267 (1977).
366. Id. at 269.
367. Id. at 277.
368. Id. at 279.
369. Id. at 279-80.
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tions that could not be justified under such a generalization. The Court
tried, however, to be a bit more specific. A remedy must be "related to
'the condition alleged to offend the Constitution.' ",370 It must in fact be
-remedial in nature, that is, it must be designed as nearly as possible 'to
restore the victims of discriminatory conduct to the position they would
have occupied in the absence of such conduct.' ",37' It also should take
into account the interests of the state and local authorities in running
their own affairs "consistent with the Constitution. 372
There was no contention made that the programs were not designed
to restore the school children to a position they would have had were it
not for the violations by the school board and the state of their equal
protection rights. But, just as the match between violation and remedy
was assumed rather than shown, there was no evidence to support the
conclusion that somehow children were being restored to the condition
in which they would have been but for the segregative acts. There was
no invasion of the province of the school board, said the Court, since it
was the board itself that chose the programs in the first place. There is
no strength to the proposition that "the court's decree must be limited
to remedying unlawful pupil assignments." Three requirements that
the Court established earlier were, not surprisingly, found to be satis-
fied. The Court relied extensively on lower court decisions to show that
it was only approving tactics that had long been used without
disapproval.373
After making it clear that its decision was ad hoc, applying only to
the facts of this case and not "a blueprint for other cases, 3 74 the Court
turned to the contention that the order for the State to pay one-half of
the additional costs for these programs was a violation of the eleventh
amendment. Because it was an order for payments of future, not past,
costs, the case fell outside the recently decided Edelman v. Jordan,375
which barred required state payment of disability benefits wrongfully
withheld: "That the programs are also 'compensatory' in nature does
not change the fact that they are part of a plan that operates prosec-
tivel;, to bring about the delayed benefits of a unitary school sys-
370. Id. at 280 (emphasis in original).
371. Id.
372. Id. at 281.
373. Id. at 283-88.
374. Id. at 287.
375. 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
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tem."'376 The decree was obviously Janus-faced.
State liability for segregative violations here does not square easily
with the Court's exoneration of the state from liability to effectuate an
interdistrict remedy in Milliken I. The two cases taken together suggest
that where an interdistrict remedy is sought, even if the state is culpa-
ble, interdistrict relief cannot be granted unless external school districts
sought to be utilized in the plan are themselves guilty of constitutional
violations. But no Justices recorded notice of this implication.
Mr. Justice Marshall wrote a concurrence applauding the Chief Jus-
tice's opinion and rejecting Mr. Justice Powell's opinion concurring in
the judgment only.37 7 Mr. Justice Powell was concerned about the pos-
ture of the case. The exact nature of his concern proved elusive. It was
somehow that there no longer was a controversy between students and
parents seeking desegregation and a recalcitrant school board. It was
now a controversy between the delinquent school board turned plain-
tiff, on the one hand, and the State on the other. And it was not a suit
for desegregation; it was a suit for money. The school board wanted
$5,800,000 from the State to effectuate an educational program of its
own creation. It was a case of so peculiar a nature to require dismissal
of the writ as improvidently granted. Having set out the unique nature
of the case-it was apparently that with which Mr. Justice Marshall
disagreed-Mr. Justice Powell concurred that the remedy was appro-
priate against a state guilty of constitutional violations, that the remedy
did not exceed the scope of the violations, that the eleventh amendment
was no bar, and that the district court appropriately "assumed the role
of school superintendent and school board" because the Detroit school
board was in such a condition of "exceptional disarray, 3 78 and be-
cause the school board had "invited this assumption of power. '379
The Powell opinion is certainly startling if its position is that local
government in "exceptional disarray" becomes subject to receivership
by a federal court, or that it can delegate its governmental functions to
a federal district court when it feels unable to perform them. That is
probably not the intended reading of the opinion, which probably only
reflects that all Justices share the notion of the omnicompetence of the
federal judiciary. But how else can one explain the proposition that
376. 433 U.S. at 290.
377. Id. at 291 (Marshall, J., concurring).
378. Id. at 296 (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment).
379. Id. at 297 n.3.
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approves transfer of power from "a board of education consisting of
members possessing no experience in education"38 to a federal judge
equally devoid of that same experience.
In conclusion Mr. Justice Powell, too, mouthed the magic formula,
which need only be stated and not proved: "our setueci doctrine requir-
ing that the remedy be carefully tailored to fit identified constitutional
violations is reaffirmed by today's result." '' But, as Powell all but ac-
knowledged, this is only a designation of a conclusion: "In my view, it
is at least arguable that the findings in this report were too generalized
to meet the standards prescribed by this Court."3 ' The assumption by
all the Justices that the remedy met the violation can be accepted only
in its most general form. If the violation can be any segregative act and
the remedy any contribution to relief of segregation, then the formula
was satisfied here. If the violation is to be particularly identified, how-
ever, there was no such identification here, and if the remedy must be
-tailored" to the identified violation, it was not done here. Certainly,
there was no evidence to suggest that but for the segregative acts,
whatever they may have been, the black students would not have re-
quired remedial reading, career and other counseling, or would be able
to respond better to tests. There was no evidence of what the condition
of the children would have been had there been no segregative acts, or
that the proposed remedies would restore the deprived children to the
place they would have had but for the segregation. A remedy matches
a violation when a court says it does and fails to do so when a court
says it does not.
Here in the identification of violations and appropriate remedies lies
the most recent controversy in school desegregation cases. Before Milli-
Aen II, the Court had made it clear that there could not be a constitu-
tional violation in the absence of intentional segregative acts by the
local government to be charged. Mr. Justice White, speaking for the
Court, clearly stated the position in Washington v. Davis.38 3 That was
not a school desegregation case, but a case of alleged government em-
ployment discrimination. But the Court relied upon school desegrega-
tion cases for its conclusion:
The school desegregation cases have also adhered to the basic equal
380. Id. at 297.
381. Id. at 298.
382, Id.
383. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
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protection principle that the invidious quality of a law claimed to be ra-
cially discriminatory must ultimately be traced to a racially discrimina-
tory purpose. . . . The essential element of de jure segregation is "a
current condition of segregation resulting from intentional state action."
Keyes v. School District No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 205. . . . "The differentiat-
ing factor between de jure segregation and so-called de facto segregation
• . . ispurpose or intent to segregate." Id., at 208. See also id., at 199,
211, 213 . . .34
Mr. Justice Powell, writing for the Court in Arlington Heights v. Met-
ropolitan Housing Corp. ,385 reiterated the proposition that segregative
intent was a prerequisite to a constitutional violation. Like White, Ar-
lington Heights did not involve school segregation but relied on school
segregation precedents.386  These two cases, White and Arlington
Heights, were brought home to school desegregation situations in cases
handed down the same day as the Milliken I decision.
In Dayton Board of Education v. Brinkman, s7 Mr. Justice Rehnquist
delivered the opinion for the Court. The other two decisions were per
curiam reversals calling on the courts below on remand to apply the
intent rule of Arlington Heights and the remedy rule of Dayton.388
The Dayton I rule, as abstracted from the opinion by the Court in
the two per curiam cases, reads:
If such [intentional] violations are found, the District Court in the first
instance, subject to review by the Court of Appeals, must determine how
much incremental segregative effect these violations had on the racial dis-
tribution of the Dayton school population as presently constituted, when
that distribution is compared to what it would have been in the absence of
such constitutional violations. The remedy must be designed to redress
that difference, and only if there has been a systemwide impact may there
be a systemwide remedy.389
When one remembers that this case was decided on the same day as
Milliken II, the possibility occurs that the Justices do not read each
others' opinions before they are handed down. Certainly, the standard
in Dayton of incremental remedies for incremental violations hardly
could be said to have been applied in Milliken II. But then it may be
384. Id. at 240.
385. 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
386. Id. at 264-68.
387. 433 U.S. 406 (1977).
388. Brennan v. Armstrong, 433 U.S. 672 (1977); School Dist. of Omaha v. United States, 433
U.S. 667 (1977).
389. 433 U.S. at 420.
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that the remedy standard of Dayton I was intended to be applicable
only to the issue of student assignment, ite., the issue of the extent of
busing, which was not involved in Milliken II.
Again, Dayton I may have represented the application of Milliken I
to a single district desegregation case. Fault is the measure of liability
in both. In both, it is suggested that the remedy must be addressed only
to curing the wrong.
Incremental relief for incremental wrongs is not inconsistent with
Milliken II. Both may fall under the label of requiring the remedy to
be addressed to restoring the plaintiffs to the condition they would have
had but for the segregative act. Clearly, Dayton I seemed much more
rigid in its demand for the delineation of the violation and for an
equally clear delineation of the remedy to match that violation, with
specific findings to be made on both questions by the trial court and
scrutinized by the appellate court. 90
In Dayton 1, the Court held that the broad busing order went far
beyond the "cumulative violations" that were alleged.391 All eight Jus-
tices (Mr. Justice Marshall recused himself), including Mr. Justice
Brennan in dissent, agreed that the remedy exceeded the violation. Mr.
Justice Stevens' concurrence entered a caveat. For him, the question of
intent depends on objective evidence and not on subjective motivation,
but he took no exception to the excessive remedy ruling.
XIX.
In the 1978 Term, perhaps in celebration of the twenty-fifth anniver-
sary of Brown I, the Court added further to its jerry-built edifice of
school desegregation doctrine. After standing the meaning of congres-
sional language and its legislative history on their heads in United
Steelworkers v. Weber,392 in which the Court withdrew from its earlier
readings of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 that the statute required equal
treatment of individuals, both minorities and majorities,39 3 the Court
also recanted its recent apostasies in school desegregation cases and re-
turned to the dogma and creed of the NAACP to which it had earlier
been true. (From apostle to apostasy-however short-lived-to apoth-
390. Id. at 417-20.
391. Id. at 418.
392. 99 S. Ct. 2721 (1979).
393. See, e.g.. T.W.A. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 71-72 (1977); McDonald v. Santa Fe Transp.
Co., 427 U.S. 273, 278-80 (1976); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971).
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eosis in a quarter of a century.) It thus demonstrated once more that,
wherever its head may be,394 the Court's heart is in the right place.
Columbus Board of Education v. Penick395 and Dayton Board of Edu-
cation v. Brnkman396 were decided on 2 July 1979. They addressed
and purported to answer three fundamental constitutional questions.
First, had the Court meant what it said in its recent cases397 about seg-
regative intent as a necessary precondition for finding a constitutional
violation? The answer was: "Yes, but. . .," which must properly be
interpreted as "No." Second, did the Court mean what it had said in its
recent cases about the necessity to tailor the remedy to the constitu-
tional violation?398 The answer, again, was: "Yes, but . . .," which
reads "No." Finally, the question answered was: "Is there an obliga-
tion on the part of the states to assure racial balance in its public
schools even in the absence of what the Court had once called "de jure
segregation?" The answer here was "No, but. . .," which, in common
sense, means "Yes." The Court obviously lacks none of the powers
over the language once asserted by Humpty-Dumpty. 99
The Columbus and Dayton II cases concerned two Ohio cities, in
neither of which had there ever been constitutional or statutory re-
quirements for the separation of the races in public schools. In Colum-
bus, however, the Court established a new meaning for the phrase
"dual school systems." Theretofore, those words seemed to have meant
a requirement that there be separate school systems for black students
and for white students. In Columbus, the phrase came to mean a school
system in which blacks were predominant in some schools while whites
predominated in others. Given the prevalence of neighborhood schools
394. "'You are old Father William,' the young man said,
'And your hair has become very white;
And yet you incessantly stand on your head-
Do you think, at your age, it is right?'
'In my youth, Father William replied to his son,
'I feared it might injure the brain;
But, now that I'm perfectly sure I have none,
Why, I do it again and again.'"
L. CARROLL, ALICe's ADVENTURES IN WONDERLAND & THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS & THE
HUNTING OF THE SNARK 45 (Schocken ed. 1978).
395. 99 S. Ct. 2941 (1979).
396. 99 S. Ct. 2971 (1979).
397. See, e.g., text accompanying note 281 supra.
398. See, e.g., text accompanying notes 262, 278, 280, 282 supra.
399. L. CARROLL, supra note 394, at c. 6, 191-204, and especially at 197.
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in most metropolitan areas of the nation, it would appear that all cities
in the country have been or are operating "dual school systems."
From the premise of the existence of dual school systems, the conclu-
sion of constitutional violation readily flowed. For once a dual school
system is found to exist, the duty of the school board to take affirmative
steps to "convert it to a unitary school system" has long since been
found to be implicit in Brown H.140 "Each instance of a failure or re-
fusal to fufill this affirmative duty continues the violation of the Four-
teenth Amendment."' 0 '
Moreover, not only did the school board fail its "affirmative duty to
disestablish the dual school system, 4 °2 it engaged in practices that
were themselves segregative in effect and, therefore, constitutional vio-
lations, such as assignment of black teachers to substantially black
schools until 1974;403 "the intentionally segregative use of optional at-
tendance zones, discontiguous areas, and boundary changes; and the
selection of sites for new school construction that had the foreseeable
and anticipated effect of maintaining the racial separation of the
schools.1 4 4 "Gerrymandering of boundary lines also continued after
1954."405
On the question of the required segregative intent, the Court denied
that the trial court had lifted itself by its own bootstraps by deriving
intent from effect. But this denial was contradicted by its own use of
the same device:
The District Court, however, was amply cognizant of the controlling
cases. It is understood that to prevail the plaintiffs were required to
"'prove not only that segregated schooling exists but also that it was
brought about or maintained by intentional state action,'" 429 F.Supp.,
at 251, quoting Keres, supra, at 198-that is, that the school officials had
"intended to segregate." 429 F.Supp., at 254. See also 583 F.2d, at 801.
The District Court also recognized that under those cases disparate im-
pact and foreseeable consequences, without more, do not establish a con-
stitutional violation. See, e.g., 429 F.Supp., at 251. Nevertheless, the
District Court correctly noted that actions having foreseeable and antici-
pated disparate impact are relevant evidence to prove the ultimate effect,
400. Green v. County School Bd. 391 U.S. 430, 437 (1968).
401. 99 S. Ct. at 2947.
402. Id at 2948 (quoting McDaniel v. Barresi, 402 U.S. 39, 41 (1971)).
403. Id.
404. Id. at 2948-49.
405. Id. at 2949 n.10.
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forbidden purpose. Those cases do not forbid "the foreseeable effects
standard from being utilized as one of the several kinds of proofs from
which an inference of segregative intent may be properly drawn." Id., at
255. Adherence to a particular policy or practice, "with full knowledge of
the predictable effects of such adherence upon racial imbalance in a
school system is one factor among many others which may be considered
by a court in determining whether an inference of segregative intent
should be drawn." Ibid. The District Court thus stayed within the re-
quirements of Washington v. Davis and Arlington Heights. See Personnel
Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney, 99 S.Ct. 2282, 2296 n.25(1979). 406
Thus, it would seem that if the trial court says that it is cognizant of the
need to find segregative intent elsewhere than in the segregative effects
that is sufficient to meet the Court's requirements, even in the absence
of any other facts to sustain its conclusion.
The Court's reasoning was equally concise and cogent with regard to
the requirement that the remedy be no more extensive than the viola-
tion. Again, that was easy if the conclusion that Columbus maintained
a dual school system was valid. But the Court did not rely on this.
Instead it accepted the trial court's ruling that, in effect, any segregative
acts within a school system necessarily have a systemwide effect justify-
ing a systemwide remedy. That conclusion, as quoted in the Supreme
Court's opinion, reads:
"Actions and omissions by public officials which tend to make black
schools blacker necessarily have the reciprocal effect of making white
schools whiter. '[Ilt is obvious that the practice of concentrating Negroes
in certain schools by structuring attendance zones or designating "feeder"
schools on the basis of race has the reciprocal effect of keeping other
nearby schools predominantly white.' Keyes [, supra, at 201 . . .]. The
evidence in this case and the factual determinations made earlier in this
opinion support the finding that those elementary, junior, and senior high
schools in the Columbus school district which presently have a predomi-
nantly black student enrollment have been substantially and directly af-
fected by the intentional acts and omissions of the defendant local and
state school boards." 429 F.Supp., at 266.407
It is not quite clear how the Keyes proposition about "keeping other
nearby school predominantly white" results in bringing all schools
406. Id. at 2950.
407. Id. at 2951 n.16.
[Vol. 1979:309
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1979/iss2/2
SCHOOL DESEGREGATION
under the guillotine. But the expansiveness of judicial language from
the particular to the general is ubiquitous in Supreme Court opinions.
The remedy invoked here was a proportional distribution of white
and black students in every school in the system. The Court justified
this by ignoring some language in Swann and then deriving its justifica-
tion from Swann. The ignored language was this:
If we were to read the holding of the District Court to require, as a matter
of substantive constitutional right, any particular degree of racial balance
or mixing, that approach would be disapproved and we would be obliged
to reverse. The constitutional command to desegregate schools does not
mean that every school in every community must always reflect the racial
composition of the school system as a whole.408
This language of Swann apparently did not mean what it said, for the
Court, in reliance on Swann, accepted the requirement of systemwide
racial balance:
Petitioners also argue that the District Court erred in requiring that
every school in the system be brought roughly within proportionate racial
balance. We see no misuse of mathematical ratios under our decision in
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1, 22-25
(1971), especially in light of the Board's failure to justify the continued
existence of "some schools that are all or predominantly of one race
.... " Id. at 26; see Pet. App. 102-103. Petitioners do not otherwise
question the remedy if a systemwide violation was properly found.4 °9
Mr. Justice White, who had written the opinion for the Court in Co-
lumbus, also wrote the Court's opinion in Dayton. It was no surprise,
therefore, that the Dayton opinion tracked the Columbus opinion with
regard to all the major issues. There was one additional problem in
Dayton that the Court readily overcame. In Columbus the Court relied
very heavily on the findings of fact and determinations of the trial
court, but it could not do so in Dayton because the facts found by the
trial court were in conffict with the conclusion that the Court wanted to
achieve.
The trial court should not be blamed. After repeated reversals by the
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit because its remedy was inade-
quate, the trial court's judgment finally reached the Supreme Court in
Dayton 10 There, the Supreme Court reversed the Sixth Circuit and
"concluded that there was no warrant for imposing a systemwide rem-
408. 402 U.S. at 24.
409. 99 S. Ct. at 2945 n.3.
410. See text accompanying notes 387-91 supra.
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edy."411 The case was remanded to the trial court to "determine how
much incremental segregative effect these violations had on the racial
distribution of the Dayton school population as presently constituted,
when that distribution is compared to what it would have been in the
absence of such constitutional violations.' 412 The district court en-
gaged in this additional fact finding and came to the conclusion that
"plaintiffs had failed to prove that acts of intentional segregation over
20 years old had any current incremental segregative effects. '413 More-
over, the trial court found that there was insufficient "evidence that the
racial separation [in Dayton] had been caused by the Board's own pur-
poseful discriminatory conduct. '414 These hurdles did not faze Mr.
Justice White. He simply wrote the same opinion as in Columbus, sub-
stituting the words "The Court of Appeals held" for the proposition
"the District Court found." The number of skinned cats lying around
the halls of the marble palace is testimony to the diversity of methods
available there to remove an epidermis. Certainly there is more than
one way.
The judgments in Columbus and Dayton were not unanimous. In
both cases, the opinion for the Court commanded a bare majority.
There were five Justices in support of the Court's judgment in Dayton
and seven in Columbus. The Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Stewart
concurred in the judgment, but not the opinion, in Columbus and dis-
sented in Dayton. Each wrote one opinion for both cases and the Chief
joined the Stewart opinion. Mr. Justice Stewart had two primary quar-
rels with the Court's position. First, he insisted on the importance of
the trial court's judgment on the issues of fact involved both in the
question of necessary intent and in the question of the scope of the
violation and the remedy appropriate to its cure:
Whether actions that produce racial separation are intentional within
the meaning of Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189; Washington v.
Davis, 426 U.S. 229; and Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan
Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, is an issue that can present very diffi-
cult and subtle factual questions. Similarly intricate may be factual in-
quiries into the breadth of any constitutional violation, and hence of any
permissible remedy. See Miliken v. Bradley!, 418 U.S. 717; Dayton Board
of Education v. Brinkman I, 433 U.S. 406. Those tasks are difficult
411. 99 S. Ct. at 2976.
412. Id. (quoting from 433 U.S. at 420).
413. Id.
414. Id.
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enough for a trial judge. The coldness and impersonality of a printed
record, containing the only evidence available to an appellate court in any
case, can hardly make the answers any clearer.415
His judgment followed his premise that the trial court was better at
finding the facts than the court of appeals and so he joined the judg-
ment in Columbus but not in Dayton.
Second, it was Stewart's view not that the Court's label of a dual
school system was in error, but that the proposition that followed from
finding the existence of a dual school system-that the burden of proof
was on the school boards to show that there was no current segregative
consequences of the 1954 original sin-was in error. Although this
probably should have led him to disagreement with the Court's conclu-
sion in Columbus as well as in Dayton, it did not.
The Chief Justice's opinion showed basic sympathies with those of
Justices Powell and Relnquist who dissented in both cases:
I agree especially with that portion of MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST's
opinion that criticizes the Court's reliance on the finding that both Co-
lumbus and Dayton operated "dual school systems" at the time of Brown
11. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 489 (1954), as a basis for holding that
these school boards have labored under an unknown and unforeseeable
affirmative duty to desegregate their schools for the past 25 years. Noth-
ing in reason or our previous decisions provides foundation for this novel
legal standard.
I also agree with many of the concerns expressed by MR. JUSTICE
POWELL with regard to the use of massive transportation as a "remedy."
It is becoming increasingly doubtful that massive public transportation
really accomplished the desirable objectives sought. Nonetheless our
prior decisions have sanctioned its use when a constitutional violation of
sufficient magnitude has been found. We cannot retry these sensitive and
difficult issues in this Court; we can only set the general legal standards
and, within the limits of appellate review, see that they are followed.4 16
Mr. Justice Rehnquist wrote a dissenting opinion in each case. Both
his opinions were joined by Mr. Justice Powell. Powell wrote an addi-
tional dissent of his own making two points that are given no consider-
ation whatsoever in the majority opinion, although their importance
cannot be gainsaid. He objected to the "wholly new constitutional con-
cept applicable to school cases.' 4 17 He thought the time had come to
415. 99 S. Ct. at 2983 (Stewart, J., concurring in Columbus and dissenting in Dayton).
416. 99 St. Ct. 2941, 2952 (1979) (Burger, C.J., concurring).
417. 99 S. Ct. 2982, 2988 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting).
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recognize that "the federal judiciary should be limiting rather than ex-
panding the extent to which courts are operating the public school sys-
tems of our country. ' 41 8 Powell was concerned on the basis of evidence
he cited that the growth of the school desegregation industry was prov-
ing harmful to the educational prospects of all school children and not
least the minority children who were supposedly the beneficiaries of the
Court's noblesse oblige.
It was left to Mr. Justice Rehnquist, as it often is these days, to dis-
sect and destroy the reasoning of the Court's opinions. If rationality
were the basis for Supreme Court judgments, the Court's constitutional
jurisprudence would be substantially different from what it is. Aca-
demics tend to charge Rehnquist's opinions to his personal predilec-
tions rather than putting that label where it belongs-on Justices
Brennan and Marshall who are often, as here, the beneficiaries of senti-
mentality by Justices White, Blackmun, and Stevens. Rehnquist's posi-
tion here, as elsewhere, suffers less from his passion than from his
dispassion, less from sentimentality than from rationality, less from an
adherence to a "higher law" than from adherence to constitutional law.
If we do not like what Rehnquist has to say, we should be bold enough
to acknowledge the reasons we do not like it. But like a majority of the
Court, we are not prepared openly to choose emotion over reason as
the guide to decision, however much we prefer decisions that satisfy
our predilections to those that satisfy our intellect.
To analyze the Rehnquist opinions here would be to take the reader
back through all that already has been noted in this article. I, there-
fore, impose on the reader only the barest adumbration of his opinion.
After decrying the replacement of local school boards by federal courts,
he also disparaged the Court's substitution of words for facts in its dis-
position of two of the fundamental questions presented to it: "'Dis-
criminatory purpose' and 'systemwide violations' are to be treated as
talismanic phrases which once invoked, warrant only the most superfi-
cial scrutiny by appellate courts. 4 19
What Rehnquist does do, by comparing what was done here with
what the Court did in the past, is to reveal the giant changes so casually
effected:
The Court suggests a radical new approach to desegregation cases in
418. Id.
419. 99 S. Ct. at 2952 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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systems without a history of statutorily mandated separation of the races;
if a district court concludes-employing what in honesty must be charac-
terized as an irrebuttable presumption-that there was a "dual" school
system at the time of Brown 1, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), it must find post-1954
constitutional violations in a school board's failure to take every affirma-
tive step to integrate the system. Put differently, racial imbalance at the
time of the complaint is filed is sufficient to support a systemwide, racial
balance school busing remedy if the district court can find some evidence
of discriminatory purpose prior to 1954, without any inquiry into the
causal relationship between those pre-1954 violations and current segre-
gation in the school system.420
Rehnquist points out that if this standard is applied, it may mean
that almost every urban school system in the nation is in violation of
the fourteenth amendment and subject to a judicial decree command-
ing racial balance proportionate to the overall ratios in every school in
every system:
If that standard were to be applied to the average urban school system in
the United States, the implications are obvious. Virtually every urban
area in this country has racially and ethnically identifiable neighborhoods
resulting from a melange of past happenings prompted by economic con-
siderations, private discrimination, discriminatory school assignments, or
a desire to reside near the people of one's own race or ethnic background.
See Austin Independent School District P. United States, 429 U.S. 990, 994
(1976) (POWELL, J., concurring). It is likewise true that the most preva-
lent pupil assignment policy in urban areas is the neighborhood school
policy. It follows inexorably that urban areas have a large number of
racially identifiable schools.
But the Constitution does not command that school boards not under
an affirmative duty to desegregate follow a policy of "integration tiber
alles." If the Court today endorses that view, and unfortunately one can-
not be sure, it has wrought one of the most dramatic results in the history
of public education and the Constitution. A duty not to discriminate in
the School Board's own actions is converted into a duty to ameliorate or
compensate for the discriminatory conduct of other entities and
persons.42 '
Mr. Justice Rehnquist's doubts about the breadth of innovation in
these cases can, I submit, be supported only by hope. Surely, the Court
did not announce in the plain terms of Brown I or Green that it was
420. Id.
421. Id. at 2964.
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seriously modifying the constitutional standards that had theretofore
applied. But strangely, in the face of the challenge of the dissenters, the
majority was silent and did not deny that it had wrought such basic
changes with which it was charged.
To the outsider it would seem that the Court has, in fact, abolished
the distinction between de facto and de jure segregation and has ruled
that any federal district court is free-perhaps compelled-to order sys-
temwide racial balance in any system in which some schools have black
majorities and others have white majorities. The only reason to doubt
this is the Court's general lack of concern for the doctrine of stare deci-
sis, so that however much the lower courts are bound by Supreme
Court decisions, it is itself bound to follow only those of its decisions of
which it approves.422
It would appear that Columbus should be placed in the Pantheon
along with Brown and Green as major achievements of the Court's re-
structuring of the American society. That there was little fanfare on the
announcement of Columbus may be due to the low key in which the
majority opinion was written. It may be that it fell in the shadow of the
previously announced United Steelworkers v. Weber. It may be that, in
the closing rush, the Justices' law clerks failed to inform them of the
magnitude of their achievement. The lack of commotion, however,
only demonstrates that the Court's social engineering may be accom-
plished insidiously as well as blatantly.
XX.
In a recent edition of his book on jurisprudence, Lord Lloyd of
Hamstead, Quain Professor of Jurisprudence at the University of
London, reported that "[o]ne of the most significant contemporary
characteristics of jurisprudence is the coming together of positivism
and natural law."423 That conjunction may be descriptive of the school
desegregation cases in the Supreme Court. Certainly, however, there is
more of what is called natural law than positivism in the decisions.
422. There is another reason to doubt that the desegregation structure has finally been topped
off. Although the Court denied certiorari in several of the cases that it had held pending disposi-
tion of Columbus and Dayton, it retained jurisdiction over the Wilmington multidistrict racial
balance order. Delaware State Bd fEduc. v. Evans, 47 U.S.L.W. 3414 (U.S. Dec. 12, 1978) (No.
78-671). The Wilmington case would appear to have been held for disposition pending elucidation
of the Supreme Court's decision in some unidentified case to be decided during the 1979 Term,
423. D. LLOYD, INTRODUCTION TO JURISPRUDENCE 84 (3d ed. 1972).
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The incentive for the joinder of natural law and positivism-akin to
mixing oil and water-was explained by Lloyd:
Behind all these attempts to find a place for a higher law may be dis-
cerned a feeling of discontent with justice based on positive law alone,
and a strenuous desire to demonstrate that there are objective moral val-
ues which can be given a positive content and expressed in normative
form, and that law which denies or rejects these values is self-defeating
and nugatory.424
One difficulty, as the Court's segregation decisions reveal, is that
there is not now, and there seems never to have been, any "objective
moral values" on which to base resolution of the particular problems
that come before a court. And, in a democratic society, in which the
members are purportedly governed only with their consent, any such
consensus of "moral values" is more likely to be found in the legisla-
ture's will than in the judiciary's judgment. Except in terms of religious
dogma and often even there, "moral values" will likely prove to be
subjective rather than objective. In any event, they are subject to
change from place to place and from time to time.
If one seeks the "objective moral value" that grounds the decision in
Brown and the cases that followed from it, and not merely the desegre-
gation cases, it is likely to be stated in the word "equality." Perhaps,
however, the true morality would be found in the rejection of the use of
race as a legitimate governmental device and of the need for racial bal-
ance in the public school classroom. The latter is a refutation of the
former.
If not a "moral value," equality, or "approximate equality," in Pro-
fessor H.L.A. Hart's terminology, is a "truism" about the human condi-
tion in society.425 Hart's other four "truisms" are "human
vulnerability," "limited altruism," "limited resources," and "limited
understanding and strength of will." These give rise to "the minimum
content of natural law":
For it is a truth of some importance that for the adequate description not
only of law but of many other social institutions, a place must be reserved,
besides definitions and ordinary statements of fact, for a third category of
statements: those the truth of which is contingent on human beings and
the world they live in retaining the salient characteristics which they
have.426
424. Id. at 87-88.
425. H. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 189-95 (1961).
426. Id. at 195.
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Neither "equality" nor any of the five Hart truisims, however, gives
rise to a judicial standard for the governance of human conduct. For to
return to Lloyd:
[A]lthough Hart refers to the implications of what he calls the approxi-
mate equality between human beings, he himself recognizes that no uni-
versal system of natural law or justice can be based upon the principle of
impartiality, or that of treating like cases alike. For the essential question
here is by what criteria we are to determine which cases are to be treated
as alike, and no such feature of the physical or psycho-somatic condition
of human beings as embodied in the idea of approximate equality can
indicate how a society may decide which cases are alike for this pur-
pose. . . .The rule of equality, therefore, cannot be derived from any
formal principle of impartiality, any more than it can be derived from the
physical or psychic nature of human beings or from the character of
human practice and experience in this age or other ages. The idea of
equality or non-discrimination is essentially a value judgment which can-
not be derived from any assertions or speculations regarding the nature of
man. No insistence, therefore, on the idea of impartiality, or the rules of
natural justice, or the "inner morality" of the law in the sense used by
Professor Fuller can afford a basis for arriving at such a principle as that
of non-discrimination. This, indeed, is fully recognized by Hart himself,
when he remarks that the idea of impartiality is "unfortunately compati-
ble with very grave iniquity.' 427
Perhaps this justifies the framers in their failure to provide for equal-
ity in the Constitution, even as amended. The Constitution states a
limit on governmental action. It is negative in form and substance. It
says that none shall be deprived of the equal protection of the laws.
And that was long taken to mean that legislative-governmental-ine-
qualities of treatment cannot be justified by specious reasons, reasons
that cannot sustain the use of a standard as a means to a legitimate
legislative objective. The color of a man's skin has to be just such an
irrelevant standard. No case has come before the Supreme Court in
which skin color, whether black, brown, red, yellow, or white, was
shown to be an appropriate measure for governmental sanction or ben-
efit. The argument that the Japanese Evacuation Cases428 reveal a ra-
tional classification on grounds of race is simply false. Whatever
rationality was found in the classification was attributed to nationality
427. D. LLOYD, supra note 423, at 86-87.
428. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S.
81 (1943).
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and not race. It might equally have been applied to Germans and
those of German descent, or Italians and those of Italian descent, dur-
ing World War II. Nationality is not the equivalent of race.
It was this notion of forbidding the states to classify students by race
that afforded strength to the Brown and Bolling decisions. For the pur-
poses of the law, the Court said a black skin is the same as a white skin.
No other distinctions may be attributed to differences in pigmentation.
When it moved beyond the equation for legal purposes of black skin
and white skin and substituted an equation of all blacks with one an-
other and all whites with one another, the Court committed a mischief
that may take longer to cure than the various uses of race by American
governments to deny black-skinned persons admission to the American
polity.
Race does not define a cognizable legal class. That does not mean
that race does not afford, at least among minorities, a sense of separate-
ness and loyalty. The only commonality about a race is the color of
skin or the geographic origin of forebearers. To use race as a class is
necessarily to assert that there are fundamental differences between
races and not merely the named superficial ones. To treat race as a
class is indeed to turn back the clock-back beyond Plessy's 1896, back
beyond the fourteenth amendment's 1868, back to 1857 and Chief Jus-
tice Taney's opinion in Dred Scott v. Sandford,4 2 9 which was indeed
based on the proposition that skin color carried with it all sorts of other
attributes-physical, moral, intellectual-which distinguished all black
persons from all white persons. We cannot eradicate racism by adopt-
ing its fundamental premise that there are differences between races
that justify distinct treatment by the law.
The principal effect of the fourteenth amendment was the oblitera-
tion of the racial classification made by Dred Scott. It took almost a
hundred years to get the constitutional engine started toward that ob-
jective. That was the contribution of Brown and Bolling. Somewhere
since, the engine seems to have been sidetracked, perhaps on the prem-
ise of Mr. Justice Blackmun in his separate opinion in Bakke,430 that
having used racial categories to justify burdens on blacks, it is not inap-
propriate to use racial categories to confer benefits upon them. Even
so, as far as the school cases are concerned, I have some difficulty in
429. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
430. Board of Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 436 U.S. 297 (1978).
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assuring myself that blacks are being benefitted by their compelled as-
sociation with whites in the classrooms of our public schools.
"Brown v. Board ofEducation was the beginning." It was the instiga-
tion of a social revolution, a revolution still in progress. But it is one
thing to start probing a revolution; it is another to accomplish it. The
limits on judicial power are not externally imposed. They are intrinsic
in the judicial function. A court cannot command societal change,
whatever it may do to induce it.
The Court went beyond Brown and Boiling to Green, perhaps on the
mistaken assumption that segregation was the consequence of the laws,
when in fact the laws were the consequence of segregation. Or it more
likely acted on proof that elimination of Jim Crow did not automati-
cally end school segregation. So something more had to be done. In
choosing the schools as the primary means for bringing blacks into full
partnership in American society, the Court may also have mistakenly
assumed that the schools are the place where social values are incul-
cated, so that bringing black and white children together would result
in proper understanding about the absence of real differences between
them. Subsidiary to this misplaced faith in the efficacy of the public
schools to reduce if not eliminate racial prejudice was the expectation
that the same educational opportunities for black children and white
children would result in equal educational accomplishments for all.
One cannot say that the Court succeeded in either of these objectives, if
they were its objectives. Frustration marks the course of its decisions.
In seeking to effect racial balance in America's public schools, the
Court frequently has been thwarted by the complexities of existing
demographic patterns and by the fact that demographic distributions
are highly plastic and malleable and still largely controlled at the dis-
cretion of the parents rather than the government. Demography, geog-
raphy, wealth, and history-not to mention the plain cussedness of a
democratic society that does not always understand what's good for
it-were factors that the courts could not control and were, therefore,
left out of the desegregation plans that were instituted almost every-
where that black and white children attend school in the same area.
The Court has not been without its successes in school desegregation.
Surely, more black children are attending school with white children
than ever before, if that's a measure of success. But it is the failures
that rankle. Almost every major American city has a predominant and
increasing black student body located in geographic areas more note-
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worthy for delinquency, disease, and drugs than for educational
excellence.
The courts will continue to grind out their desegregation decrees.
Some will have the same effect as Canute's mandate to the tide. But
the Court may take pride in the fact that it addressed "The American
Dilemma" when no other branch of government was able or willing to
do so. Its accomplishments are real, but inadequate. Perhaps, admis-
sion to the American society must come for the black, as it has for the
new entrants of times gone by, through entry into the middle class. Ed-
ucation-schooling-is one of the hallmarks of the middle class: it
may be a necessary, but it is not a sufficient, condition. In any event,
the school desegregation cases soon lost sight of education as the con-
cern that justified its entry into the arena. Whether the school cases
have enhanced or inhibited the reconciliation of the races is a question
that I think is not yet answered.
None, however, should gainsay the good faith and integrity of a
Court dedicated to wanting to bring about what it believes must be
good for the nation. If it has erred, its error was in trying too much, not
too little.
Between the idea
And the reality
Between the motion
And the act
Falls the Shadow
Between the conception
And the creation
Between the emotion
And the response
Falls the Shadow431
431. T. ELIOT, THE COMPLETE POEMS AND PLAYS 58-59 (1952).
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